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[For details of Communist policies toward various sociological, political, and economic aspects of present-day China, see the entire text in category 116.]

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HISTORICAL SETTING

I. INTRODUCTION

Historically, the Central-South Region of China cannot be approached as an entity. The six provinces which comprised the region during its brief existence from 1949 to 1954 present as much diversity and similarity in historical and cultural growth as would any other six provinces of China proper. 101

Their historical-cultural development divides them into three areas: (1) Honan, at the center of developing Chinese civilization; (2) Hupeh-Hunan-Kiangsi, transitional provinces between North and South China; and (3) Kwangtung-Kwangsi, constituting a naturally defended and economically self-sufficient unit that was brought relatively late into the traditional Chinese complex and has since shown tendencies toward separatism.

In one respect, the six provinces share a common characteristic. Their indoctrination in Communist ideology and their accomodation to land reform have been carried forward at about the same pace. This rate of progress has been considerably behind that of the North and Northeast regions, somewhat behind that of the East, and considerably ahead of the Southwest and part of the Northwest regions. 668

of these men were from Kwangtung. When the Manchu Dowager Empress Tz'u Hsi resisted the new measures of the "Hundred-Day Reform" of 1898 and proved incompetent to resist encroachment by the foreigner, a large part of the reform sentiment turned toward revolutionary republicanism. In that camp also, the leader was a native of Kwangtung -- Sun Yat-sen.

Until the May 4th Movement of 1919, the membership of the various revolutionary organizations evolved by Sun Yat-sen was largely composed of natives of Kwangtung. It consisted mostly of youths educated abroad or in missionary schools, merchants and overseas emigrants from Kwangtung, and opportunistic militarists and their armies based in Kwangsi. Working with, if not within, the various revolutionary organizations was the membership of various secret societies. They were strongest in the Central-South Region below the Yangtze River.[31]

E. Kwangtung and Kwangsi Separatism

The separatist tendency of Kwangtung and Kwangsi was strengthened with the failure of the

31. S. Chen and R. Payne, Sun Yat-sen, A Portrait, New York, John Day. Co., 1946, pp. 52-54 and passim. Also see Lyon Sharman, Sun Yat-sen, His Life and Meaning: A Critical Biography, New York, John Day Co., 1934, pp. 61-63; and MacNair, op. cit., pp. 8-9, 25-26, 65-72.

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provincial government. It was noted as a model of discipline and organization. Both men were highly critical of Chiang Kai-shek, but they rallied to the national cause when Japan attacked China in 1937. Li Tsung-jen won new fame by leading his troops to one of China's few victories at T'aierhchuang in 1938.[33]

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G. Sun Yat-sen

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Overshadowing the militarist Ch'en Chi-t'ang, who controlled Kwangtung for most of the period from 1928 to 1937, were the province's civilian contributions to the revolution. Sun Yat-sen stood head and shoulders above the rest.[34] He is still a revolutionary symbol which neither the Communists nor the Kuomintang can completely ignore.

Born in 1868, Sun was active in every phase of revolutionary work during the three decades following Japan's defeat of China in 1895. The organizations he evolved -- the Hsing Chung Hui

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33. H. Freyne, China's New Deal, New York, The Macmillan Co., 1943, pp. 174-75; and P.M.A. Linebarger, The China of Chiang K'ai-shek [sic]: A Political Study, Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1941, p. 102.

34. The main sources for Sun Yat-sen are Chen and Payne, op. cit., Sharman, op. cit., and M. B. Jansen, The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1954.

(Revive China Society) in or before 1895, the T'ung Meng Hui (Common Alliance) in 1905, the Chung-hua Komintang (Chinese Revolutionary Party) in 1914, and the Chung-kuo Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party) in 1919 -- were the principal channels of Chinese revolutionary endeavor in those years. In his travels about the world, he solicited funds from overseas Chinese and arranged for material aid from French and Japanese government representatives to finance a series of uprisings. He had a great part in the planning and leadership of most of the revolutionary attempts made in China between 1895 and his death in 1925, with the exception of the 1911 outbreak that overthrew the Manchu regime.

His[1] most lasting influence, however, was as a theoretician. Sun's thinking was cast in a western mold but was ingrained with traditional ideas. This was a reflection of his early training in the classics, overlaid with a higher education in western schools, an adult life lived outside China, largely in Europe and American, and extensive reading in the writings of western social, political, and economic thinkers.

The result was a syncretic, propagandistic doctrine that never reached the stage of logical systemization and planning. Its main features are: the Three People's Principles (San-min Chu-i) -- nationalism, democracy and improved livelihood; the three-stage attainment of responsible government -- military conquest and dictatorship, party tutelage, and democracy; and the five-power constitution, adding an examination and censorate branch to the tripartite western

[1] [i.e. Sun Yat-sen. -- Analyst]

system of executive, legislative, and judicial branches. They are still the foundation of the Kuomintang on Formosa. 829

Sun's will exhorting his comrades to attain these and other principles he had worked out was read every Monday morning to the school children and officials throughout China during the ascendancy of the Kuomintang on the Mainland. The short-lived alliance with the Soviet Union, negotiated by Sun after being rebuffed by the West when he sought material and financial aid in building a strong China following World War II,[1] has put Sun in the Communist camp as well. His birthday and death are still officially observed and commemorated by the new regime. In his New Democracy, written in 1940, Mao Tse-tung placed himself in line as the heir to, and completer of, the revolutionary work, which the bourgeois Sun Yat-sen had initiated.[35] 668

H. Hu Han-min and Wang Ching-wei

Just below Sun stood Hu Han-min and Wang Ching-wei. Both men were eager for power and 665

35. Mao Tse-tung, "China's New Democracy," Sharaf Athar Ali, tr., reproduced in U. S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism, Supplement III, Communism in China, Washington, D. C. U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949, pp. 67-91, and especially pp. 80-84.

1 [errata: should be World War I.--Analyst]

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the invasion of China by Japan, the provinces of Hunan, Hupeh, and Honan were a frequent battleground. During the political chaos that followed the death of Yüan Shih-k'ai in 1916, Honan was subjected to the exploitations of various warlords, ambitiously moving northeast with the intent of seizing Peking or retreating to the southwest after being ousted from the national capital. Hupeh and Hunan were likewise exploited by warlords, as those in the North tried to extend their power southward and the Kwangsi-Kwangtung faction attempted to establish themselves in the North. During and after the northward march of the Kuomintang armies, the provinces were the scene of violent peasant uprisings and suppressions. With the National Government seated in Nanking in 1928, the three provinces became an area of contention between the Kwangtung-Kwangsi warlords and the central government's forces.[41]

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K. Mao Tse-tung

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Out of the turmoil in Hunan and Hupeh in these years came a number of the Communist leaders who today hold high places in the current regime. Hunan's most famous revolutionary product is Mao Tse-tung. The leader of the

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41. That these provinces were continually overrun by one group after another was due to their lack of natural defenses and their position between the center of political power at Peking and the natural havens for lawless or revolutionary elements in the South and West. Being food surplus producing provinces, they also were coveted by ambitious factions.

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vanguard of the proletariat, the Communist Party, is by his own admission the son of a stern, rich-peasant, petit-bourgeois father. With slight education in the classics and a smattering of western education, Mao was impressed by K'ang Yu-wei's monarchical reformism, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's moderate republicanism, Sun Yat-sen's radical republicanism, Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei's "idealism," and Ch'en Tu-hsiu's pragmatic science and democracy before committing himself to Communism at the age of twenty-eight.[42]

Mao's main contribution to the 1925-27 revolution was the rousing and organizing of peasants in Hunan and Hupeh. The most militant of them, along with like-minded groups under other Communist agitators, became the nucleus of an armed force by which Mao was able to begin establishing soviets in China and gain personal ascendancy in the Party. Besides force and power politics, Mao owes his leadership to his ability to see and deal with actualities. Many of his actions and much of his thinking in accommodating to reality before 1949 would have been counted as Communist heresy if he had failed or lost the leadership of the Party. Because he suceeded, Mao is hailed in Communist China and accepted, perhaps only warily and grudgingly,

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42. On Mao Tse-tung, see his autobiography as related in Snow, op. cit., pp. 111-67.

in the Soviet Union as a theoretician who has made a major contribution to Marxist revolutionary theory. 668

With the establishment of the People's Republic, Chinese Communist thought and action have outwardly, at least, conformed more closely to Communist dogma. At the same time, Mao surrendered the ideological spotlight to another Hunanese, Liu Shao-ch'i. Liu has closely followed the international Communist line in his writings but has shown a strong tendency to explain and reinforce it with elements of Chinese traditional thought.

Another Hunanese of lesser rank is Li Li-san, the first head of the All-China Labor Union. He has had more experience outside the country than most of the Communist leaders. Having studied as a student in France before he joined the Party in the early twenties, he also spent more than a decade in Moscow after he fell into disgrace as a Party leader. P'eng Te-huai is a name well known to Americans. He commanded the "Chinese People's Volunteers" in Korea for all but the initial months of their participation in the conflict and represented China in the peace negotiations at Panmunjom.

The most notable current Communist figure from Hupeh is Lin Piao. A graduate of Whampoa Military Academy, he commanded the Red Army which swept through the Central-South Region after winning victories at Peking and Tientsin, and led the Chinese troops during their initial intervention in Korea.

war against Japan the prestige of military men was greatly enhanced. A military career has now become a major attraction to ambitious intellectuals as a possible channel for social advancement. Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung, who owe much of their popular success to their military skills, suggest the prestige granted military men in the modern period. 701 178

III. SOCIAL STRUCTURE UNDER THE COMMUNIST REGIME

The Chinese Communists interpret the existing social structure from a Marxist viewpoint, and extoll the ideal of a classless society. Their belief that the transition from a class society to a classless society is inevitable justifies the liquidation of certain surviving classes. 565 668

A. Class Differentiation among the Chinese Population

In his book On the People's Democratic Dictatorship (1949), Mao Tse-tung divided Chinese Nationals into those who because of their anti-revolutionary character and their "crimes against the Chinese nation" were deprived of the right to be numbered among the People; and those who were to enjoy the rights of the People. In the first group were included the Kuomintang leader Chiang Kai-shek, "bureaucratic capitalists" such as H. H. Kung and T. V. Soong, "feudalistic" landlords, and a host of other anti-Communist leaders. The

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second group consisted of workers, peasants, the petty bourgeois, and the national bourgeois. Workers were considered the elite of the nation; the peasants were to be converted into rural workers, through collectivization of agriculture, or into urban workers, through the development of industry; the petty bourgeois were needed during the New Democratic Stage and were to be "re-educated" in the process of reconstruction; and the national bourgeois, once "enslaved" by capitalism were now "free" to contribute to the industrialization of China. Mao's classification of the Chinese population and his stipulation of the task of each class at the New Democratic Stage formed the conceptual basis from 1949 to 1954 for the Communist policy toward each of the classes.

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The convocation of the National People's Congress in 1954 is considered by the Chinese Communists as the conclusion of the New Democratic stage and the beginning of a transitional stage which, will lead China to socialism. Land reform is completed and the landlords as a class are eliminated, the wings of the bourgeois industrialists and merchants have been clipped by the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, and the ideology of the working class has been established in all sectors of China.

B. The New Social Ladder

The Communists distinguish between persons "from the working class" and those

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"possessing the ideology of the working class." They acknowledge that not all Communists are from the working class but those who have accepted its ideology belong to it. By the same logic, the working-class character of the People's Liberation Army is fixed. The Communists say that, since the People's Liberation Army is led by the working class, viz. the Communist Party, although the bulk of the soldiers and commanders may not be from the working class, the army remains of the working class. Conversely, many workers may not possess the ideology of the working class. The Communists explain that most Chinese workers are fresh from the villages where "feudalistic ideas" abound and therefore have not had time to learn modern political ideology as it is understood by the working class.

The classification of people according to the ideology they prefer is one of the underlying principles governing the activities of Communist-sponsored organizations where membership cuts across class lines. The New Democratic Youth Corps, the Federation of Democratic Youth, the Young Pioneers, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, the Democratic Women's Federation, the labor unions, and the study circles at schools and in factories help to disseminate Communist ideology. Participation in these mass organizations, whether voluntary or compulsory, serves to separate the individual from his family, absorbing his time and energy outside the family circle. Enforcement of the Marriage Law, principally

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through the promotion and supervision of the Democratic Women's Federation, encourages *women to leave the confines of the family*. The recruitment of candidates for institutions of higher learning and the assignment of jobs to graduates when they have completed their education also serve to uproot the individual from his immediate environment and make him dependent for advancement on the Communist regime. The weakening of family loyalty forces the individual to look toward the mass organizations sponsored by the Communists, who regard the Party itself as a desirable substitute for the traditional social structure. Since the individual relies on mass organizations for political advancement, which is the prerequisite for economic and social betterment, the mass organizations are most important for stabilization of society under the current regime. The regime exercises the power to control the career expectancies of the members of mass organizations, reward the achievement of those who work for the goals of the Party leadership, and punish with ostracism or more severe penalties those who rebel against the order. For the first time since the abolition of the imperial examination system, a main channel of social advancement has emerged. The mastery of an officially approved body of doctrine is the quickest road to social advancement. The Communist channel of social advancement leads to the selection of conformists. This state of affairs resembles, to some extent, that which prevailed in monarchical times when the mastery of dogmas

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contained in the classics and their commentaries was the prerequisite to success in the imperial examinations. 156 668

The Communist regime has found it necessary to promote as replacements for the old ruling group Communist-reformed and Communist-trained administrative, technical, and scientific personnel. Compared with traditional social movement, that which is in favor under the present regime does not spring from ideals embodied in Chinese culture but from expedient manipulation by the Communist Party. 668 178

The development of industry, waterway and irrigation projects, the settlement of the Northwest, and the nationalization and collectivization of many enterprises may conceivably absorb a good portion of the ambitious younger generation. If social movement continues to depend on Party loyalty, purges may be used to secure loyalty, to provide a flow of scapegoats for the many grievances which accumulate under a totalitarian system, and to furnish opportunities for advancement for the coming generation, whose continued devotion to the regime is crucial to its survival. But to date in the Central-South Region the purge of local cadres and officials at the regional level has been limited to the elimination of "old social elements" rather than to the "revolutionaries" themselves.[11]

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11. Consult the study of Political Dynamics in this handbook.

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(3)...The abolition of the feudal system of marriage, which neglects the interests of the children, and the putting into effect of the New Democratic system of marriage, which protects the lawful interests of women and children.[11]

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In propagandizing and implementing the Marriage Law, the regime struck hard against the old authoritarianism of the family head, child marriages, mistreatment of women and discrimination against them as inferior to men, and the mistreatment of children by parents. Wives, especially wives of arranged marriages, were encouraged to seek divorce from intolerant, unrepentent husbands. However, if husbands could be made to adopt the new attitude toward women, partners of arranged marriages were urged to remain united.

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To help traditionally-minded families attain the new Communist-established goal of "democracy" and "harmony," Family "struggle" meetings were arranged under cadre supervision. Each member was pressed to confess his own past sins and suffering and to help other family members to remember theirs. The particular transgressions sought out for exposure,

11. "Document 7," C.B., 236, pp. 22-29.

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condemnation, redress, and rectification were the mistreatment and beating of wives by husbands, similar behavior by mothers-in-law against daughters-in-law, and interference by parents in young people's free choice of marriage partners. Much was made in the Communist press of the suicides or murder of women and young people, attributed to "the old feudal system of marriage."[12]

Whatever the humanitarian by-products, the Marriage Law aimed at a basic change in Chinese society with two utilitarian purposes in view. One was to change the popular basis of loyalty from the family to the state. The other was to free the Chinese woman from her preoccupation with the home and children so that she might become a laborer in the field and factory. These aims were quite openly expressed.

For instance, an article in the Peking News Chung-kuo ch'ing-nien pao [China Youth] on the correct attitude toward parents, asserts that under the Confucian system with its emphases on filial piety, parents had the right to regard their children as private property and demand sacrifices of them. Under the new regime, the article pointed out, "children are not the private

12. See especially C.B., 273, pp. 1-8; 236, pp. 4-14; and Survey of the China Mainland Press, Hong Kong, American Consulate, 932, p. iv; hereafter cited as S.C.M.P. The same conditions apply to this source as to Current Background; see footnote 9.

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property of their parents, but belong first of all to the state and to the people, and...the interests of the people should be the highest criterion governing our actions toward our parents."[13] 668 596

An editorial in the People's Daily in March 1955 notes that remnant feudal ideologies still obstructed "the participation of women in Socialist construction and various political activities." The editorial then goes on to state that it is in order to promote the political and production zeal of women that their rights must be promoted and protected and the Marriage Law implemented.[14] Various comments on the Marriage Law inspired by the regime stress Lenin's dictum that sex relationships and family problems are not individual or small affairs but matters of great social, economic, and political significance.[15] 668 562

B. Implementation of the Marriage Law

As the Nationalist Government had made no attempt to put into effect the marriage and family provisions of its 1930-31 codes among the rural population, the spirit and provisions of the Marriage Law were new and alien to the great 671 582

13. S.C.M.P., 973, p. 31.
14. Ibid., 106, p. 15.
15. See, for instance, C.B., 275, p. 4; and S.C.M.P., 1048, pp. 30-31.

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for their education and to share in inheritance of family property, the concubine rarely came with her Chinese mate when he returned to his native village.[43]

During the absence of the male head from his Chinese home, his wife usually acted as head of the household. She and her children were supported in great part by funds periodically remitted from abroad by the male head, and she had control of the dispersion of this and other family income derived from labor or property in the home village. The usual source of income at home was from agriculture.[44]

Although the economic status of emigrant families ranged from poor to wealthy, the overseas communities were on the whole wealthier than non-emigrant neighboring villages. The excess of the wealthier families' dual income was largely invested in land and houses.[45] When the Communists took over the area, they were faced with the problem of what attitude ought to be taken toward these landlord families whose income from abroad was a vital source of foreign exchange for the government.

Evidently, no special privileges or status

43. Ta Chen, Emigrant Communities in South China: A Study of Overseas Migration and Its Influence on Standards of Living and Social Change, ed. by Bruno Lasker, N. Y., Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, pp. 140-43.

44. Ibid., pp. 58-85, 106-17.

45. Ibid., p. 110.

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were initially allowed members of such families, and their real property was expropriated on the same basis as that of any other element considered to be exploitive by the regime. On the other hand, the government exerted every effort to influence members of overseas families to write letters to their relatives abroad, setting forth the benefits of land reform and Communist reconstruction in order to woo overseas Chinese sympathy and investments in every way possible.[46]

The Communists did gain a favorable response from a part of the overseas element, but it was apparently not up to Communist needs and expectations, for various experiments and temporary shifts have marked the regime's subsequent policy toward the overseas Chinese and their dependents in China. New efforts to attract their sympathy were initiated in early 1955. Much publicity was given to the reclassification of overseas landlords as "no longer enemies of the state" before the expiration of their five-year probationary period. Buildings expropriated from overseas Chinese for government use were reportedly being returned to their former owners or paid for. The press reiterated the theme that measures were being taken to assure the right to ownership of overseas remittances and their delivery into the proper hands.[47]

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46. C.B., 211, p. 40.

47. See section entitled, "Overseas Chinese" in S.C.M.P. during the first six months of 1955; for instance, 985, p. 15.

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origin; the clubs operated hostels and sometimes arrangements for mutual aid. Secret societies provided another focus of social life, particularly in the towns and cities. Their rituals, passports, and secret signs of greeting were all subordinate to their basic aim, which was to provide members with security-through-association, with an insurance against the hazards of a disintegrating and increasingly predatory society. 369 575

It will be noted that the ties of kinship and custom were strong even between the large modern cities and the farm villages. The ways of life tended increasingly to diverge, yet one of the strongest cohesive forces of all was the common set of attitudes and values which, even when change has been accounted for, held together all Chinese of village and town and city. 369

D. The Influence of Communism

In discussing Communist efforts to alter the Chinese way of life, it should be stressed that our material is unsatisfactory. Statistics, declarations, news releases give few realistic details of life in the villages under Communist domination, and most refugees from Communist China have come from the citie 668

First of all, the farmer's annual routine is basically unchanged. Pilot collectives are in operation, but these are few and have no immediate bearing on the farmer's work year. The most striking change in the farmer's life is the new network of associations which the government has imposed upon him and the daily barrage of advice and exhortation to which he is subjected. No longer does he cultivate his land in the manner of his ancestors with the assistance of his family, his clan, and his neighbors. He no longer

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sets the periods of work and of rest. The Communist leadership is determined that the peasant shall be transformed in three ways: he must be made to produce more; he must become a politically conscious, active supporter of the Communist regime, and his attitudes and values must be radically changed. 668

The instrument of this transformation, which is visible and active in the villages, is the Party cadre. Party cadres act as the eyes, the ears, and the mouths of authority.[10] "They are called upon to take the leadership in organizing production and to participate in all types of farm work, such as mobilizing the peasants for cultivation, teaching new farming methods, distributing new seed, performing grain requisitioning, helping in planting, building and repairing dikes, etc."[11] The village cadres have been mainly outsiders, "foreigners," but the Party has been recruiting youths from specific localities and training them to return there as cadres. The cadre was the instrument of land redistribution and brought into the countryside the first major change decreed by Peking. The cadre organized the Peasants' Association in the village and manipulates its meetings and its officers. It was the cadre who worked up sentiment and organized the "speak bitterness" meetings in the days of the Land Reform Movement -- occasions used to the full to attack the old familial order in the villages. It is the cadre who organizes the "struggle meetings" in which villagers are made to engage in criticism and self-criticism in order to undermine the old values and instill the new. 668 241

10. Walter E. Gourlay, The Chinese Communist Cadre: Key to Political Control, Harvard, Russian Research Center, 1952, p. 25.

11. Gourlay, op. cit., p. 28.

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The cadres also pushed the organization of "mutual-aid teams" for the sharing of labor and equipment, an effort that struck at the familial organization of farm labor and apparently met with serious difficulties.[12] More recently the cadre has been the instrument for the concerted attempt to build producer co-operatives in the countryside. In such major efforts as the attempt to put Hunan rice farming on a two-crop basis (hitherto only done further south), the cadres were reportedly responsible for training 100,000 farmers.[13]

The cadre carries on the effort to destroy traditional mores. He publicizes the new marriage law, discourages or prevents arranged marriages, lectures on sanitation, and, sometimes with the help of radio, films, and mobile theatrical units, dramatizes the issues of the day, the need for the farmer to sacrifice, to send his sons to the army, to contribute labor to community projects, to inform on his neighbors, to buy bonds, and so forth. The cadre establishes "winter schools" in which the peasants are given intensive political indoctrination, practical training, and instruction in reading and writing. Hunan reported that 2,500,000 peasants were enrolled in these schools in the winter of 1955.[14]

The age-old drive of the vigorous peasant to in-

12. W. W. Rostow, The Prospects of Communist China, Cambridge, 1954, p. 84.

13. Reported by New China News Agency, Changsha, Apr. 20, 1955; Survey of China Mainland Press (SCMP), 1036, Apr. 28, 1955.

14. People's Daily, Jan. 30, 1955; SCMP 984, pp. 30-31.

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crease his family's land holdings is checked by fear lesthe be re-classified as a "rich peasant" and be subject to higher taxes and other pressures. Yet what the Communists deplore as the peasant's "spontaneous capitalistic tendency" has not been crushed, and the landholdings of the more enterprising grow in size.[15] 668 425

The effort to force various forms of co-operative work have not been completely successful. 668 474

> "...when a serious team-use of labor, tools, and farm animals was attempted, a variety of unsatisfactory results emerged; quarrels among the families interfered with efficient output; no one assumed responsibility for the upkeep of communal property; the claims of inefficient members violated the sense of equity of the more efficient..."[16]

Yet the villagers' way of life has been greatly altered by the intervention of the government, through the cadres, in all social, economic, and political activities. The pressure to conform, at least outwardly, is formidable. Self-chosen leisure time activities are few, meetings occupy a great deal of time, and attendance at harangues by Party cadres, entertainment furnished by traveling theatrical groups (all with their ideological message) take up more of his 517 668 369

15. Rostow, op. cit., p. 152, cites the Peking People's Daily, Feb. 15, 1954.

16. Rostow, op. cit., p. 84.

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leisure. The slack winter season may now find him in winter school or involved in a community work project directed by the local cadre.

Settlement of accounts before the New Year holiday now means payment of taxes and the sale to the government of most of the balance of the farmer's grain, for which he receives coupons. The cadres carry this out at the village level.[17] The New Year festival itself is characterized by some traditional acitivites, modified to promote government aims, and by some new features. The peasant may buy New Year's pictures to decorate his house, but they will probably be romanticized portraits of Mao and other Communist heroes rather than the colorful deities of former days.[18] He may decorate his gate with pai red mottoes, but the mottoes will no longer carry the old wishes for long life, happiness, and wealth, but exhortations to conform to Communist standards.[19] The government may allow some additional foods for the season, but gambling is forbidden, and social life is no longer restricted to family and friends. In Hunan, the peasants were urged to organize their own dramatic troupes to play the approved repertoire, and travelling troupes brought dramas to the villages. The cadres organized "cultural lectures" and mobile movie teams showed instructive films. The old exchange of visits with relatives in nearby towns now has its Communist counterpart: interchange of visits between urban and rural workers' groups to observe one another's progress in Communist reconstruction.[20]

17. SCMP 979, Feb. 2, 1955, p. 30.
18. Enlightenment Daily, Jan. 23, 1955, p. 2.
19. Cf. the collection of mottoes in Hua-nan t'ung-shu, [South China Almanac], Canton, 1953, p. 32.
20. Enlightenment Daily, Jan. 23, 1955, p. 2.

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The seasonal short pilgrimage, in company, to some nearby shrine also has, in Hunan, its Communist counterpart: a mass pilgrimage from the city of Changsha to Mao Tse-tung's native village, which is being built up as a national shrine.[21] Despite its frontal attack on the old familism, the Communist government last year provided special trains to take city dwellers back to their native villages for the holiday; a mass exodus was reported from Peking.[22]

Ch'ing-ming is no longer an approved festival, presumably because of its function as a celebration of kinship ties and family continuity. The next approved traditional holiday is the Dragon Boat festival in June. The boat races have been revived, and the poet Ch'ü Yüan, now a "People's hero martyred in protest against a corrupt feudal regime," is the focus of celebrations.[23] The moon festival in autumn is also celebrated with extra food allowances and "cultural" activities. The various anniversaries of the Chinese Communists and of the world Communist movement probably do not break into the agricultural working year, but may be occasions for special propaganda arranged by the local cadre. It will be seen that the pattern of living in the villages has been drastically altered; what remains of the old pattern is precisely what the government and the Party permits in the interest of morale or adapts in the interest of their rural program of change and indoctrination.

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21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.; also, SCMP 972, 1954, p. 21.
23. SCMP 1075, June 23, 1955, p. 25.

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E. Changes in Patterns of Living

In the towns and cities, as in the countryside, the greatest changes in living patterns have been brought about by the network of new associations by which the regime envelops and controls the individual. Workers in various traditional crafts, merchants, industrial workers, all are organized by the Party, and it is within these groups, under the guidance of the cadres, that the urban working population is most strenuously indoctrinated. In long and frequent meetings, the city dweller is under intense pressure to manifest "correct attitudes," to show himself free of all "feudal" and "bourgeois" taint, and to demonstrate his complete comitment to Communist goals. Through these and other channels he is under continual pressure to step up his efficiency and productivity. The meetings take such a toll of his energy at the end of the working day that they are openly referred to as "fatigue meetings."[24]

City and town dwellers are also organized into street and ward units, and through these they are given further directives on the management of their lives. The townsman, more than the peasant, is open to an around-the-clock propaganda barrage. From the first call to early morning calisthenics, the radio blares in every street until late at night. There is pressure to join sports groups, study groups -- all with their ideological purposes. The major Communist holidays are celebrated in the cities with great parades and with endless speeches. Privacy, the chance to be at ease with family or friends, is rare.

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24. Rostow, op. cit., p. 160.

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The New Year's holiday has retained some of its old gaiety, although within the same restrictions imposed on the peasant. The cities receive special shipments of seasonal delicacies, and trips back to the family village may be possible for a small percentage of town dwellers.[25] Major sports events and theatrical performances are scheduled for this season, and visitors from rural areas come to the city in large numbers. There is special provisioning of the city shops at the time of the mid-Autumn and the Dragon Boat festivals.

The cities have been cleaned up and enlarged, and building has apparently proceeded rapidly, although improvements in housing probably mainly affect the industrial workers, the favored class in the drive for industrialization.[26] Yet the Rostow study indicates that there has been no real increase in wages for the urban worker.[27] His diet remains poor, his work hours long. But since the Party is anxious to recruit from urban workers, he does have opportunity to rise in life through Party work. Many industrial workers probably do feel some sense of identification with the most rapidly expanding sector of the Chinese economy. This identification and the opportunities offered by the Party are probably slowly changing the goals of the urban worker. He may be less interested than he once was in returning to a plot of land in the country, where economic opportunities are increasingly restricted. He knows, after attending one Party meeting, that the peasantry is no longer the favored class in the Chinese economy.

25. Enlightenment Daily, Jan. 23, 1955, p. 2.
26. Rostow, op. cit., p. 160.
27. Ibid., pp. 160-61.

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The elite of the towns and cities are the functionaries of the government and Party. We know little of the pattern of their private lives. But, if the badge of the old Chinese bureaucratic elite was a leisurely and cultivated air, the badge of the new is a full briefcase and an air of purposeful, energetic activity. Their incomes permit their families a life somewhat easier than that granted the rest of the urban population, but they are constantly under discipline, watched by their colleagues, obliged to meet work quotas and to submit to continuous indoctrination and re-indoctrination. Party and government workers are urged to use the New Year holiday to plan their work for the year to come.

The bulk of the old middle class may have survived, but its activities have been increasingly restricted by government controls and the growth of government producing and marketing facilities. They are a tough and tenacious group, but their old comfortable life is already threatened and, as a class, they are scheduled for extinction.[28]

The growing cities now appear to be replacing the country as the goal of the ambitious. It is likely that, as urbanization and industrialization proceed, the cities rather than the farm villages will determine, as the Communists plan, the mores, the patterns of living for society as a whole.

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28. Rostow, op. cit., pp. 162-64.

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II. BASIC ATTITUDES

One of the principal reasons for the stability and long life of the old order in China was its social homogeneity. The imperial government fostered uniformity of attitudes and values, and Chinese statemen believed this to be a more binding, durable, and cheaper cement for the imperial order than governmental coercion. Old China was primarily a way of life, a system of values and attitudes, and on this premise the state was organized. A foreigner who wished to become "naturalized" had only to show that he accepted Chinese attitudes and values; this he did by adopting Chinese dress and speech and patterns of behavior. 181

This characteristic of the old order is one of the reasons why we find no important regional variations in basic attitudes. The other reason is that the Communist government is as determined, in enforcing a uniformity of values and attitudes, and far more resourceful, than was the imperial government of the past. 181 668

There are, however, certain local variations in temperament and ethos which affect, to a minor degree, the basic attitudes and values. A few of these will be noted. For the variant attitudes and values of ethnic and religious minorities, see the chapters on Ethnic Groups and Religion.

There have been profound changes in basic attitudes over the last century and particularly during the last five years. Change has been brought about by 181 668 178

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two factors. The first is the disintegration of the old social and political order resulting from its failure to adapt itself to the problems and pressures of the modern world. Consequently, people became critical of the older attitudes and, in increasing numbers, adopted newer "modern" attitudes and values which were considered better suited to a modern China. The second is the power of the Communist state which, in the last five years, has been used to inculcate a new and uniform set of values and attitudes.

These two factors are closely inter-related. Thus the Communists have been making a systematic use of individual and group-dissatisfaction with the old order to inspire and promote the acceptance of the new attitudes and values; the latter's appeal has been particularly strong with youth -- especially adolescents -- and with women who have been taught to regard the old social order as tyrannical and oppressive. The following will illustrate this last point:

> Co-operative agriculture has organization,
> and women are not left out.
> In the old society we were badly mistreated,
> but the new society teaches friendship
> and love.[1]

In addition to capitalizing on discontent, the Communists have been making a peculiar use of traditional attitudes and values. Certain values from the old order still have a strong emotional appeal for the Chinese people. And the Communists seek to make the new order more acceptable by associating some of its elements with selected elements from

1. Fu-nu San-tzu Ching [Three-character Classic for Women], Hsin-hua Publishing House, 1950, p 21. Three-character rhymed verses were widely used in traditional China for indoctrination of the young.

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the traditional culture.
For example, they insist that as a guiding principle of personal behavior the idea of "struggle" (tou-cheng) must replace that of "harmony" (ho).[2] People are taught to struggle for self-perfection and to engage in class struggle, in the struggle for a new China, and in the struggle against deviation even when this involves attacking their friends. This is utterly contrary to the old ideal of harmony in personal relations, an ideal that meant in practice a comfortable adjustment to one's natural and human environments. Yet in urging all to struggle, the Communists insist that the ultimate goal of all struggle is the Ta-t'ung Ching-yü -- the traditional utopian ideal of a harmonious, frictionless social order.[3]

In discussing certain attitudes and values we should bear in mind that the power of the old and the appeal of the new vary not according to regions but according to social groups. It was among the population of modern cities like Shanghai that the old values were first challenged by the pressures of modern problems, but among the peasantry and rural gentry, despite many discontents and tensions, the old ways still prevailed.[4] Intellectuals and members of the new industrial and commercial groups were the first to discard traditional attitudes and adopt Western values; among other groups this process was slower. These variations affect Communist tactics to the extent that different kinds of persuasion are used with different groups. But the final goal is adoption of the attitudes and values decreed by the Communist leadership.

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2. Cf. Arthur F. Wright, "Struggle vs. Harmony: Symbols of Competing Values in Modern China," World Politics, Vol. VI (Oct. 1953) pp. 31-44.

3. Mao Tse-tung, On People's Democratic Dictatorship 3d. ed., Peking, Foreign Languages Press,

[see next page]

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etc.[15]

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Province	Lay Adherents	Modern Organizations
Honan	4,070	3
Hupeh	286,900	17
Hunan	64,100	15
Kiangsi	26,700	10
Kwangtung	154,550	28
Kwangsi	2,730	17

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Such Buddhist schools and institutes as had survived have been taken over by the Communists. Buddhist periodicals have been stopped, publishing houses closed. Two Communist-sponsored Buddhist magazines have appeared, one in Peking, one in Shanghai; they are devoted to reconciling Buddhism and Marxism.[16] A new Chinese Buddhist Association was formed in Peking in November 1952, with several leading Buddhist scholars among its leaders. Unlike the earlier Buddhist Association, which was organized by Buddhists to reform and defend their faith, the new body is sponsored, organized, and manipulated by the state and Party. In May 1951, a Party central committeeman outlined the chief tasks for Chinese Buddhists: (1) participation in

15. Shen-pao Nien-chien [The Shen-pao Yearbook] 1933, p. T2.

16. Atrocities. According to this report the circulation of Communist-sponsored Buddhist magazines is very limited.

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land reform, (2) opposition to counterrevolutionaries, (3) participation in the Resist-America-Aid-Korea Movement, and (4) recognition of the duty to construct a new religion in the new society.[17] The new association, like all others in Communist China, will be primarily used for the indoctrination and control of its members.

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In the principal cities a few temples are maintained; a biased account says that the number of Peking temples in religious use has fallen from 1,300 to 3, that in Nanking the number has decreased from 400 to 1.[18] There are occasional reports of Buddhist ceremonies, such as the celebration of the Buddha's birth day.[19] We have no detailed reports from the Central-South Region, but it is reasonable to assume that Buddhism is being steadily and systematically eliminated from the life of the area. Buddhist belief is a handicap to youth who must adopt Marxist orthodoxy in order to succeed in life. The old may cling to their beliefs, but their influence on their children is now slight. The cadres in the countryside are attacking "superstition," and their ridicule of old Buddhist-linked observances is

17. Richard L. Walker, China Under Communism, pp. 188-9.

18. Atrocities

19. New China News Agency, Peking, May 29, 1955; Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1058, p. 48.

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probably further undermining the faith. The clergy, never up to their task of serving a modern type religious community, has been largely secularized. There is little in Buddhist doctrine to steel the believer to resist authority or the trend of the times. The willingness of some Buddhist leaders to openly embrace Communist doctrine has probably undermined what little will to resist there may have been.[20]

III. TAOISM

Some of the tendencies noted in the modern history of Chinese Buddhism are also to be found in Taoism. But the differences are many, and they spring from fundamental differences between the two religions.

It is convenient for our purpose to consider two levels of Taoism. One is Taoism as an organize

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20. The outstanding example is Chü-tsan -- a modern-minded reformist monk with an excellent background in philosophy, religion, and social work -- the latter particularly in Hunan. He was one of two Buddhist delegates (out of 585) to the People's Political Consultative Conference. Chan, op. cit., p. 92, records Chü-tsan's willingness as of 1948 to support a Communist regime. Cf. also, Chü-tsan's article, "A Buddhist Monk's Life," in China Reconstructs, Jan.-Feb. 1954, pp. 42-44.

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had set up or co-ordinated two-hundred primary schools and twenty high schools; the Islamic Theological College at the Chungking mosque was opened in 1945. All of these institutions, however, were handicapped by the poverty of the Chinese Moslem community and by suspicion of Chinese learning born of religious conservatism.[42] 779 797

What have been Chinese Communist policies towards the problem of Chinese Islam, a problem that involves some areas where they are a major segment of the population and other areas -- such as the Central-South Region -- where they represent a cohesive, slowly modernizing religious community? (The policies adopted towards major centers of Moslem population, are dealt with in the chapter on Ethnic Minorities.) Communist religious policies toward Mohammedanism have something in common with Communist policies toward other religions. The standard pattern of organization has been established by the Peking government: an All-China Islamic Association which, it should be emphasized, differs from former organizations in being an instrument of control over Chinese Mohammedans operated by a hierarchy ideologically acceptable to the Communists. A Peking propaganda booklet issued in 1955 states that, "The work of education is really tackled seriously now, and the number of primary 779 668

42. Chan, op. cit., pp. 198-205.

and secondary school pupils is now double the figure before liberation."[43] This may sound like "progress," but what it undoubtedly means is that the children of Chinese Moslems are increasingly being given the prescribed Communist education.

The cadre is the basic instrument for the Communization of Chinese Islam. Offering the education and prestige inducements of Party work has apparently successfully recruited cadres from among young Chinese Moslems. "In the government organs there have been many Moslem cadres. Some of them have taken up the leadership jobs. In the areas where the Moslems have been comparatively concentrated, the government has paid attention to foster the basic-level Moslem cadres."[44]

The policy of Communization is well reflected in a speech by Ma Sung-t'ing, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Moslem Cultural Association, on the occasion of the "Second Enlarged Conference" in June 1955. This conference, he said,

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43. Chinese Moslems. A NCNA dispatch dated June 9, 1955, states that Moslem students in Shanghai have increased from 290 in 1949 to 3,000. Government subsidies (and control) might account for this. SCMP, 1068, June 14, 1955, p. 35.

44. SCMP, 1068, June 14, 1955, p. 35.

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"...will study how to help the government to carry out the ideological education in patriotism, national unity, and Socialist transformation among the Moslems, so as to further strengthen and consolidate national unity and continue to develop and raise the Moslem political, economic, and cultural levels in jointly carrying out the construction of the fatherland."[45]

The Chinese Communists' policy toward the Moslems has been affected by two factors which do not influence their policies towards other religions: (1) the Russian pattern of handling integrated minority groups through various types of "culturally autonomous" organizations; (2) Chinese ambitions in Islamic areas of Asia, which foster tactical tolerance towards the Islamic minority in China. Thus the glamorized picture publication Chinese Moslems has texts in English, Chinese, Arabic, and Indonesian, and its introduction ends with the greeting "Salaam to all peace-loving Moslems."[46] There are reports of special food arrangements for Mohammedan communities, especially in Ramadan. Selections from the works

45. NCNA dispatch, SCMP, 1067, June 11-13, 1955, p. 24.

46. Chinese Moslems.

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of Mao Tse-tung have been translated into Arabic for the indoctrination of the Ahungs who do not know Chinese; one suspects that these translations will also find their way overseas to Indonesia and other countries where Arabic is a sacred lingua-franca. Mosques in "show" cities have been renovated and serve to demonstrate to visitors the "reality" of Communist China's promise of religious freedom.

We have little information on the fate of Islamic establishments and clergy and adherents in the Central-South Region. Without the relative safety in numbers offered by the large communities in the Southwest and Northwest, and without the need -- save perhaps in Canton -- to make a good impression on visitors, the process of Communization, secularization, and integration are probably advancing rapidly in Central-South China. The Chinese Moslems have shown more cohesive and more steadfast resistance to government pressures than any other religious group; their resistance to assimiliation in Russia has been, in some areas, striking. The great question is whether the Moslem cadre, backed by the full force and apparatus of the Communist government, with appeals to nationalism and anti-imperialism in his sausive arsenal, will have more success than the policies of previous governments. Our guess is that he will.

V. CATHOLICISM

The older of the two Christian faiths in China has had 350 years of missionary and organizational

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It is not possible to document the proportion of Chinese Protestants who have made their peace with the Communist regime, but "modernism," the social gospel, sectarianism, and the lack of such punitive sanctions as excommunication all tend to make the Protestants less resistant to Communist force and persuasion than the Catholics. A leading Chinese Protestant layman -- under what degree of pressure we do not know -- found a number of ways to come to terms with Communism: (1) as far back as the founding of Judaism, men's highest hope has been the establishment of a solidly united, ideal society; the Communists promise such a society; (2) sectarianism has created dissension, but the Chinese have a genius for compromise; therefore, there is an opportunity to promote (under the Communist government) "a grand union of the churches"; (3) Christianity is a religion of world revolution, but it has been fettered and frustrated by feudal and reactionary institutions. The age of Marxism-Leninism, therefore, is favorable to the realization of "Christian ideals."[68] Chinese Protestants are under a barrage of such statements, which can go so far as to assert that Jesus was a "patriotic anti-imperialist" in defending his country against

68. Ts'ai Yung-ch'un, "Progressive Road for Christianity in the New China," Hsin Kuan-ch'a [New Observation], Vol. I, No. 8, Oct. 10, 1950; Current Background, 40, Dec. 15, 1950, p. 3.

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the Romans.[69] How successfully Chinese Protestants as a whole are resisting this type of persuasion and the manifold pressures and blandishments of the Communist regime is unknown. Again, as in the case of the Catholics, loss of Protestant youth to the Communist "religion" would mean that the future of China is dark indeed.

The Central-South Region has fewer centers of Protestantism than some other, more accessible, parts of China. The following tabulation gives the percentage of the Central-South population which, in 1938, was Protestant. The second column gives the total number of Protestants in 1924:[70]

Province	1938	1924
Honan	3.7%	12,418
Hupeh	4.3	14,725
Hunan	3.2	11,018
Kiangsi	2.2	7,827
Kwangtung	18.2	61,262
Kwangsi	1.4	4,722

It will be noted that except for Kwangtung, whose capital Canton is the oldest port of entry for

69. Hsu, op. cit., p. 41.

70. Ku T'ing-ch'ang's percentage figures published in the Collectanea Commissionis Synodalis, Vol. XI, 1938, pp. 272, 281. Tables reproduced in Damboriena pp. 90-91. The 1924 figures are from The China Yearbook, 1924, p. 629.

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ments came under the direct control of the Central People's Government. There is no doubt that the elimination of the regional government as such simplified the hierarchy of administration and that it is a measure in agreement with the tradition of China as a unitary state. From that time, the provincial governments were directly under the control of the Central People's Government, but the chairmen of the provinces were allowed to continue in office until the promulgation of the Constitution. The names of the chairmen were as follows:

Province	Chairmen	Term
Honan.....	Wu Chih-p'u	1949-55
Hupeh.....	Li Hsien-hien	1949-54
Hunan.....	Wang Shou-tao	1949-52
Kiangsi.....	Shao Shih-p'ing	1949-55
Kwangtung..	Yeh Chien-ying	1949-54
Kwangsi....	Chang Yüan-i	1949-54

Because of the differences in geographical position, the varying economic conditions which prevail, and the differing characteristics of the people in the various provinces, an examination of the work of the provincial governments should be useful for an understanding of the political situation.

Chairman Wu Chih-p'u reported[9] that the peasant movement sponsored by the Communists

9. Wu Chih-p'u, "Ho-nan-sheng Jen-min Cheng-fu I-nien-lai Shih-cheng Kung-tso Pao-kao," ["Report on the Administration of the Honan People's Government during the Past Year"], Cheng-fu Kung-tso Pao-kao Hui-pien, 1950 [Compendium of Government Reports, 1950], Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1951, p. 828.

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involved 21,900,000 members, or 73 per cent of the total population of 30,000,000. Among the workers in twleve cities and the laborers employed at the Hsin Yü coal mines, 71,711, or 47 per cent, of a total of 152,613 men, were members of the trade union.[10]

In ten hsiang in Chia county, 223 landlord families and 283 rich peasant families, 9 per cent of the population of 5,863 families, owned more than 1,900 mou (about 316 acres) of land before the "Liberation" -- 49 per cent of the land in the ten hsiang. Although the anti-despot movement and the rent-reduction movement had reduced their holdings, the average acreage owned by "landlords" and "rich peasants" remained nearly twice as much as that owned by the peasants and hired farmers. After reform, the average amount of land owned by the "landlord" became 1.46 mou (about 1/6 of an acre), that of the poor peasants was raised to 1.5 mou, that of the rich peasants to 1.9 mou, and that of the middle peasants was increased from 2 mou to 2.7 mou.[11] These figures suggest how sweeping the land reform movement was. Land reform was of first importance to the Communist regime because its inauguration gained the support of the peasants who formed the majority of the population.

Hupeh Province, in the Yangtze Valley, has a greater concentration of industry than the neighboring Honan Province. As in other provinces, land reform became a major part of the Communist program in Hupeh. Li Hsien-nien, chairman of Hupeh, reported that the movement for rent re-

10. Ibid., p. 828.
11. Ibid., p. 828.

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duction was successfully concluded about October 1950, and that approximately 206,500,000 catties (227,150,000 lbs.) of rice had been refunded to poor tenant farmers. Peasants' associations, with a total membership of 4,141,466, were organized in 15,175 hsiang throughout the province. One-fourth of the members were women. As a result of the organization of the peasants' associations, the power of government passed into the hands of Communist officials in 5,190 hsiang, although in the remaining 9,985 hsiang the change was only a partial one.[12]

Since the Chinese Communists well knew that popular support was necessary for a strong government, they had the wisdom to establish the Peasants' Association, which in a certain way worked as an informal representatives' conference before the regime was able to establish a formal one in each hsiang or county.

Wang Shou-tao, chairman of Hunan Province, mentioned in his report of June 1950[13] that there were 14,830 hsiang in the province, and that Peasants' Associations had been formed in 19,564 hsiang, with a total membership of 5,730,000. Chin Ming, chairman of the Land Reform Committee of Hunan, reported in October 1950 that, because there were 28,000,000 people in the two municipalities and 77 counties of Hunan, it would be necessary to limit land reform to 33 counties with a total population of 17,000,000. He expected that within a year or two the work of land reform could be completed.

12. Li Hsien-nien, "Hu-pei-sheng Jen-min Cheng-fu I-nien-lai Shih-cheng Pao-kao Yü Chin-hou Jen-wu ["Report on Last Year's Administration and Future Tasks of the Hupeh People's Government"], Ibid., p. 862.

13. [following page] .

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There are 99 counties and three municipalities, with a total population of 27,460,000, in Kwangtung Province. The vice-chairman, Fang Fang, reported that, of this number, 19,210,000 were peasants. A table released by Chen Han-sen, a research fellow of sociology and economics at the Academia Sinica, was quoted by Fang Fang,[17] as follows: 30 per cent of the arable land in Kwangtung Province was designated as a source of family revenue for the ancestor-temple; 23 per cent of the arable land was owned by 110,000 landlord families; 13 per cent was owned by 220,000 rich farmer families; 13 per cent was owned by 1,090,000 families of the middle peasantry; and 19 per cent was owned by poor and hired peasants in 4,040,000 families. These figures, Fang Fang maintained, showed the inequality of land distribution; 53 per cent of the arable land was owned by the landlord families, who constituted only 2 per cent of the total number of families in the province. Fang Fang said: "The People's Government must take a cautious attitude because this area was late in being liberated and because its geographical position is too remote to be influenced by the older liberated areas. Furthermore, the proximity of this province to Hong Kong and Macao makes it more accessible to bandits and spies who are always trying to stir up disturbances.[18] The people of Kwangtung are not so submissive as those in other provinces, in spite of the fact that much propaganda work had beendone by the Communist regime to induce them to accept land reform.

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17. Fang Fang, "Kuan-yu Kuang-tung T'u-ti Kai-ko Wen-t'i Ti Pao-kao" ["Report on Land Reform in Kwangtung Province"], Ibid., p. 938.

18. Ibid., pp. 941-42.

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Kwangsi Province, like Kwangtung, lies near the Pearl River. It was for many years under the separate rule of Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi, both of whom were strongly opposed to Communism. Long before the Communists came into power, Li and Pai warned the people of Kwangsi against the threat of Communism, and as a result the Communists found it most difficult to win the support of the people. Li Ch'u-li, a member of the Kwangsi Provincial Government, mentioned in a report in October 1950 that the membership in the peasants' associations was only 1,340,000, the second smallest membership in the Central-South China Region.[19]

IV. THE REPRESENTATIVES' CONFERENCE

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The Representatives' Conference was utilized by the Communists in the period 1950-53 as a preparation for the People's Congress, which had not yet been established. Chairman Wu Chih-p'u gave a report on the representatives' conferences held in the counties, municipalities, and Peasants' Associations of Honan, listing the number of conferences held and the membership involved.

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19. Li Ch'u-li "San-nien-nei Shih-hsien Kuang-hsi-sheng Ti T'u-ti Kai-ko Shih Kuang-hsi-sheng Jen-min Ti Kuang-yung Jen-wu" ["To Complete Land Reform in Kwangsi within Three Years is the Proud Task of the Kwangsi People"], Ibid., p. 967.

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POLITICAL DYNAMICS

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It is the nature of the Communist regime to seek to place all political power in the hands of a single party -- the Communist Party of China. This is the basic factor in the pattern of political dynamics in Communist China and in the Central-South Region. Political dynamics is concerned with political power and political process. Since political power is monopolized by the Communist Party of China, and since the political process is patterned upon the controls exercised by the Party, political dynamics deals with the study of the Party itself, its political control, and the elections and politics of minor parties. The power structure is such that the decision-making process follows a course largely determined by the organizational and operational pattern of the Party. Through a well-established network of control over organizations of all types, political activities are regulated and guided by the Party. The Party rather than society as a whole generates the vitality that lies behind the political process. To control the course which society is to follow requires the adoption of a total approach to all problems and the mobilization of all available instruments of compulsion in society.

A campaign,[1] one of the means by which the Party

1. For a discussion of campaigns, see Richard L. Walker, China under Communism, the First Five Years, Yale University Press, 1955, pp. 77-100; W. W. Rostow, The Prospects for Communist China, Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1955, pp, 72-98.

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implements its political processes, calls for concerted action among interested groups at all Party levels, initiated by a signal which sets organized forces in motion. A campaign is also a device to test the efficacy of the members of all organizations and a means to eliminate those who are deemed undesirable. It may be either national or local in nature,[2] directed toward either the population as a whole or a segment of it. In the present context, a campaign should be regarded as a political device rather than a manifestation of political or social process.

The centralization of both government and Party is the second factor determining the pattern of political dynamics in the Central-South China region. Local agencies in this region are held under Party direction by four major means: (1) the maintenance of a unified and effective Party organization throughout the region; (2) the control of administrative and judicial organs, people's procuratorates, and public security organizations; (3) the control of mass organizations; and (4) the agitation of popular enthusiasm, the manipulation of popular will, and ultimately, the control of elections and of the composition of the people's congress.

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2. Typical drives of a local nature are those conducted in farming communities: Spring Plowing Summer Collection, Resist Drought, Resist Flood, Autumn Harvest, and many others.

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B. PARTY CONTROL OVER MASS ORGANIZATIONS

Communist policies toward mass organizations have been well calculated and effectively carried out. These policies encourage and regulate the activities and political utilization of mass organizations.

From the Party point of view, mass organizations are a political asset because each of these mass organizations represents a specific segment of the populace and is itself a social or economic force.

Immediately after the Communist seizure of power in this region, mass organizations sprang to life. Not until 1952, however, was their organization placed upon a permanent basis. There are as many mass organizations in this region as at the central level.[45] The most influential are here singled out to illustrate the pattern of Party control.

1. Trade Unions

Trade unions are regarded as the transmission

45. See Chao Kuo-chün, The Mass Organization in Communist China, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Institute of Technology, 1953.

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belt by which the Party and the workers are linked.[46] Their organization is patterned after that of the Party. A Central-South China Trade Union Working Committee is established as the delegate of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions.[47] Under the regional Working Committee, local trade union councils stretch from provinces, municipalities, and counties to towns (hsiang is not included, for farmers and handicraft workers are not considered eligible).

The establishment of Party control over the trade unions in the Central-South China region did not prove easy. A gigantic and drastic campaign was required before control was comfortably secured. The "democratic reform" campaign, launched in the midst of land reform in the summer of 1951,[48] was directed at the trade unions and was aimed at the

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46. Chinese text of the Constitution of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions in People's Daily, May 14, 1953, p. 2; English text in Current Background, No. 248, June 22, 1953.

47. The Working Committee was formally established on October 4, 1952, Hsin Wuhan Pao [New Wuhan Daily], Oct. 5, 1952, p. 2; prior to that it was known as the Preparatory Committee of the Trade Unions.

48. Provincial reports on the completion of the movement in Kwangtung, see Yangtze Daily, Nov. 28, 1951, p. 2; in Honan, ibid., Nov. 27, 1951; in Canton, Yangtze Daily, Nov. 29, 1951, p. 3.

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liquidation of old trade union leadership and the strengthening of the Communist hold over the urban populace.

To facilitate the Party's political control over trade unions, there is a basic trade union branch or cell, similar to the Party branch, composed of the trade union members working in the same enterprise. If the branch is of sufficient size, this basic trade union committee will set up a workshop (department) committee. The trade union committee may be divided into trade union teams according to production units. The general methods employed by the Party for political control over other organizations are applicable here, of course. Trade union affairs are subject to the direction of the Party commission on trade unions; and Party members are placed in key positions within the unions.

However, the most effective method is the initiation of union policies in the Party rather than in the union.[49] This involves three steps: first, the Party branch within the union initiates major policies, including directives, working plans, and cadre policy. Secondly, the Party branch suggests to the presidium of the Trade Union Council policies in need of discussion. Party members elected to the presidium direct the trade union meeting and successfully pilot the Party proposal through the presidium. Third, after the resolution is adopted, Party and corps members must accept it unconditionally and serve as

49. People's Daily, May 8, 1953, p. 2.

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activists to make certain that it is carried out.

2. Federation of Democratic Women

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On October 27, 1951, Ch'ien Ying, then Chairman of the Federation of the Democratic Women of the Central-South China region, declared that the federation's membership had reached twenty-one million, or almost one-third of all the women of the region.[50] The federation's importance in this region, however, is not based merely on numerical supremacy. The position of women in society is such that they not only constitute an important part of the labor force, but their influence extends throughout the entire population. The Communists correctly regard the federation as a major political force and are most eager to see that women's organizations are formed.

At the village level, the federation is the most active part of the rural movement. The wide participation of women in the Peasants' Association should be particularly noted. The provincial Federation of Democratic Women of Hupeh alone mobilized 12 million women during the Land Reform Movement, almost 40 per cent of the total membership of the peasant's associations in the provinces.[51] The Federation plays a political role in all the farm drives and gives full support to the hsiang governments and party apparatus. Since the completion of land reform, women have begun to take an active part in the

50. Yangtze Daily, Oct. 28, 1951, p. 1.
51. Ibid., Dec. 3, 1950, p. 4; July 13, 1951, p. 3.

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producers' co-operatives. In May 1954, the All-China Federation of Democratic Women held its first Rural Work Meeting and called upon all women on the farms of China to join the movement.[52] The activities of rural women are not limited to the land. In Kiangsi alone, for example, more than 50,000 women belong to the militia.[53] [701]

In the cities, women are important to the urban inhabitants' committees and the worker's family committees, both Party devices for urban control. Apart from participation in all drives in the cities -- notably the "democratic reform" movement and Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns -- the Federation of Democratic Women also co-operates with the Department of Women Workers of the trade unions. The federation also urges all women, including housewives, to participate in social work.

Party control over women's federations follows the same pattern as that for other mass organizations. The Party as well as the New Democratic Youth Corps maintains a commission on women's affairs. The commission has the power of direction and policy-making. However, the work of the commission is subject to the supervision of other basic departments such as the departments of organization, propaganda,

52. People's Handbook, 1955, pp. 386-87.
53. Yangtze Daily, July 13, 1951, p. 3.

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and rural work, and so forth. Party personnel are placed in key positions in the federations.

3. Other Mass Organizations

A number of mass organizations which have a strong influence on society are represented in this region. The All-China Federation of Democratic Youth[54] maintains branches in all key cities and counties in a province. The Central-South branch of the All-China Federation of Literature and Art Circles was established[55] in November 1951. The most elaborately organized group is the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, established in 1949. By July 1952, it claimed a membership of 6,676,776, with 7,681 branches in the counties and towns of the region.[56] Party control over these mass organizations follows the usual pattern.

C. POLITICAL CONTROL IN THE RURAL AREAS

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The rural movement is the foundation of Communist political power in Central-South China. Here lies the strength and the weakness of the region and of the Party; here the pattern of political dynamics is most revealing and Communist power encounters the greatest opposition.

54. Regulations governing ACFDY in People's Daily, June 17, 1953, p. 1.
55. Yangtze Daily, Nov. 19, 1951, p. 1.
56. Ibid., July 10, 1952, p. 1.

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The establishment of Communist power in the rural areas can be divided into three stages: the initial construction period prior to the completion of land reform, when political power was centered in the peasants' associations and closely related to land reform in the rural areas; the consolidation period, a period of experiment for the producers' co-operative movements, marked by a gradual shift of political power from the Peasants' association to the hsiang government, controlled by the Party; the election- and the post-Constitution periods when the continuous suppression of oppositions in the rural areas (during the elections of 1953-54) strengthened the foundation of Communist political power, and when such political power has been firmly entrenched in the government and the Party (during the post-Constit tion period).

1. Initial Construction: 1949-1952

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Communist leaders have constantly emphasized the political significance of land reform.[57] They regard it as a political struggle, and its very essence is conceived to be the abolition of the "feudal" system of landownership, the creation of a political force under Party control, and the establishment of "democratic authority." Teng Tzu-hui declared that

57. Liu Shao-Chi's report on land reform in Enlightenment Daily, June 30, 1950, p. 1; English text in The Agrarian Law of the Peoples' Republic of China, Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1950. Also Teng Tsu-hui's report, Yangtze Daily, Dec. 27 1950, p. 1.

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the political aim of the movement is to be placed above any economic aim.

Land reform is divided into three stages: preparation, execution, and re-examination. The preparatory stage is aimed at the liquidation of the existing holders of political power. The execution stage includes confiscation and redistribution of land in order to destroy the basis of the landlord class. During the re-examination stage, the foundation of new political power is laid.

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During the land reform period, political power in the rural area[58] rested upon: (1) the Party, (2) the Peasants' Association, (3) the hsiang government, (4) the militia, and (5) other mass organizations, notably the women's federations and youth organizations. Of these, the Peasant's Association and the militia, organized as instruments of terror, were of particular importance.

The chief task of the Peasant's Association was to incite people to action and to provide a receptive group which could be controlled by a small number of Party members. Poor peasants, farm laborers, and middle-class peasants constituted one-third of the membership; but the peasant's associations were

58. For reference, consult Kung-fei Ju-ho K'ung-chih Nung-ts'un Yü Ch'eng-shih [How the Communists Control Villages and Cities], Taipeh, 1954; also, Nung-ts'un Kung-ch'an-tang-yüan K'o-pen [Textbook for Rural Party Workers], Canton, Hua-nan, 1951.

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organized only after the Party had established control over such earlier peasants' organizations as the Poor Peasants' Corps, Peasants' Mass Meeting, and Peasants' Representatives Conference. Further, although plenary meetings were held, the true power of the association lay with the executive committee, which was under Party control.

The militia, an armed force at the disposal of the Party, is an organization of poor peasants, farm laborers, and young people. As of December 1950, the strength of the militia in the Central-South China region was placed at 1,480,000 men.[59] In Hupeh, a membership of 220,000 was reported in September 1950. Prior to May 1950, the militia structure was complex and unwieldy. It was reorganized in May 1950 and more thoroughly, in 1952.[60] According to a January 1952 directive of the Central-South China Military and Political Committee,[61] each village was to have a platoon, each ch'ü forms a company. Its size is in no sense comparable to its military counterpart. Operationally, area commands at all levels can employ the local militia. The People's council, with the approval of the military command

59. Yangtze Daily, Dec. 15, 1950, p. 1; in Hupeh alone, a reported 220,000 men in Sept. 1950; ibid., Sept. 23, 1950, p. 2.

60. Ibid., March 31, 1951, p. 3; for the employment of militia prior to the Party's assumption of power, see ibid., Aug. 24, 1953, p. 3.

61. Ibid., Jan. 5, 1952, p. 1; for a study of militia, see Li Tang, Militia of Communist China, Hong Kong, Union Research Institute, 1954.

of the area, can employ the militia for such duties as the transportation of food and the guarding of granaries. 668 701

The duties of the milita in peace time are to assist the public security organizations in matters concerning arrests and detention, co-operate with troops in campaigns against bandits, to guard bridges and transportation centers, and to take charge of food transportation and the maintenance of order at public meetings. In war time, the militia's duty is to co-operate with area commands in district defense.

2. Consolidation Period: 1952

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As land reform came to a close, Communist power was established but not yet unchallenged in the rural areas. First, many villages and hsiang were controlled by "reactionary" elements[62] who, in some instances, were said to have succeeded in bribing Party members. Such a phenomenon was often reported, and in 1954 ten per cent of the villages in the country as a whole still belonged in this "backward" category.[63] Secondly, the cadres were said to be generally apathetic. For this the Communists gave four reasons: (a) the low educational level of the cadres which made them incapable of successfully completing assigned tasks; (b) the "five-fears" reportedly

62. See chapter on Subversive Potentialities.

63. Yangtze Daily, Aug. 23, 1951, p. 2; of early report, in ibid., Sept. 1, 1950.

existing among the cadre -- fear of injustice, fear of liquidation, fear of individual loss resulting from Party-re-education, fear of criticism from above, and fear of revenge;[64] (c) abuse of power by the newly-rich activists, whose status and income rose after the land reform; and (d) the temptations of city life.

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Together with reports of general apathy was the Wu-to (the "five-too-many") phenomenon.[65] Its name has reference to the practice of allowing a single individual to hold too many different jobs at one time, and it was one of the causes contributing to Party inefficiency in the rural areas. It was reported that a corps member in a village in Hupeh held five jobs and had to attend meetings thirteen times a week.[66] This phenomenon was nationwide and was so serious that the Communists issued directives to remedy it.

The first task in rural areas after the period of land reform was increase in production through the establishment of mutual-aid teams and the organization of agricultural producers' co-operatives. This task was assigned to the Party and the hsiang government.

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64. Ibid., Aug. 29, 1950, p. 5; Jan. 6, 1952.

65. The "five-too-many" pertained to tasks, meetings and conferences, memoranda and forms, organizations, and jobs. See People's Daily, June 26, 1953, p. 1.

66. Yangtze Daily, Oct. 17, 1951, p. 2.

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The consolidation of the Party's political power in the rural areas involved the following steps:[67] re-examination of Party members and overhauling of Party branches; election of new officers in Party and government apparatus; and appointment of hsiang Party secretaries with enhanced functions. The hsiang Party secretary was placed in charge of the four seasonal production drives on the farms and the activities of the yough corps. The secretary in charge of organization supervised indoctrination and Party schooling and was concurrently responsible for the establishment of "democratic systems." The secretary in charge of propaganda handled matters concerning the agricultural producers" co-operative movement in addition to his propaganda jobs.

Administratively, the hsiang head (assistant-secretary of the Party) had charge of civil affairs, whereas the council member on production looked after the mutual-aid teams and co-operatives. The council member on educational and cultural matters was also in charge of the propaganda network.

The process of consolidation was speeded by the requirement that all policy information be first discussed by the Party organizations. Then, under the auspices of the hsiang government, a representatives' conference, which included delegates from all mass organizations, was convened to secure mass participation.

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67. Yangtze Daily, Sept. 1, 1951.

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3. The Election and the Post-Constitution Period

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Premier Chou En-lai's announcement of a nation-wide election in 1953 and the fact that the majority of the 280,000 hsiang had completed All-Circle People's Conferences indicated the degree of Communist confidence in their power.[68]

At the village and hsiang levels, the key task in the period prior to the election was the allocation of election districts.[69] In the Central-South China region, the original 4,100 ch'ü were increased to 5,300 ch'ü and the number of hsiang was increased to 10,000. Consequently, as explained by Teng Tzu-hui, the size of each hsiang was reduced to make for easier control. In the hsiang (which averaged 1,500 inhabitants) election districts were drawn up. From these districts representatives were elected to attend hsiang representatives' conferences, from which hsiang governments were organized.

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After the promulgation of the Constitution, Communist political power was further strengthened. The hsiang People's congress now holds the highest formal authority in the locality, but the true power remains with the hsiang People's council. Resistance remains strong in the rural areas, however, and in 1955, two strong countermeasures were passed by the Party.[70] Further expansion of agricultural

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68. Chinese text of Chou's report on Government Works in Chou En-lai: Cheng-chih Pao-kao 1953 [Political Report of 1953], Peking, Jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1953, p. 16.

69. Teng's report before the Fourth Conference of Central-South China Military and Political Committee in Yangtze Daily, Dec. 13, 1952, pp. 1-3.

70. "Wei-shen-ma Pi-hsü Chung-shih Nung-yeh

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producers' co-operatives was temporarily checked, and the first Rural Basic-Level Organization Conference was held in April 1955 for the purposes of strengthening Party leadership over the agricultural producers' co-operative organization in order to begin gradual collectivization.

The following resolutions were adopted at the Conference:[71] (1) Party organization shall be based on territorial and production units, with emphasis on the development of more Party branches in the agricultural producers' co-operatives. (2) Collective work rather than individual achievement is to be stressed. (3) There is to be further expansion of Party indoctrination programs. (4) The county Party secretary's leadership and the Party's political role in the producers' co-operatives is to be strengthened.

The chief problems which the agricultural program of the Party faces are the need for cadre education, the lack of Party strength, and the peasant's sense of individuality and love for his own land.

D. POLITICAL CONTROL IN THE CITY

The establishment and consolidation of Communist

70. (continued) Sheng-ch'an Ho-tso-she Ti Kung-ku Kung-tso?" ["Why Should Productive Co-operatives Be Strengthened?"], New China Monthly, March, 1955, pp. 133-134.

71. Summary report on the Conference, New China Monthly, No. 4, April 1955, pp. 27-28.

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power in the cities followed the same general course as in the rural areas. The Democratic Reform Movement, directed in particular at the urban population and the trade unions, and the violent Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, directed at the Party itself, the government administration, and industrial and business circles of society, in effect, performed functions similar to those in the land reform in rural areas. 668 •

Communist power in the city is retained through the maintenance of a set of control organizations, extending from workers' trade unions to the students' federation.[72]

The Urban Inhabitants' Committee, composed of one-hundred to six-hundred families, is organized with the stated aim of contributing to the welfare of the residents. The basic unit is a family residing in or sharing a house with others. Under the committee are sub-committees representing fifteen to forty families. Minority nationality groups and workers' residential areas are organized in similar units. It is reported that more than 70 per cent of the cities in China are under the control of these organizations.

The Urban Street Office is a representative of the city government and acts as a liason between the

72. Regulation of committees, People's Daily, Dec. 31, 1954, p. 1-2; English text in Current Background, No. 310, Jan. 17, 1955.

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government and the street for the maintenance of public order. Its jurisdiction parallels that established for the Public Security Sub-Station, thus enforcing a double-check on residents. The Public Security Sub-Station is responsible, in the main, for the maintenance of public order and the suppression of counterrevolutionaries.

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The Mediation Committee[73] is a "mass" organization established both in the city and in the village. Its function is to mediate disputes and to propagandize government statutes, and, provisionally, to exercise "judicial" power in the village or street for misdemeanors not covered by the Peoples' tribunal. Although the committee acts as a third part in a dispute, it represents the government's view and emphasizes the technique of self-criticism.

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Communist control in the city is much more rigid and forceful than in the village. With the spread of Communist domination over many organizations, factories, and other professional organizations, Communist domination is strengthened. Although public security sub-stations play a leading role in enforcing government decrees, the importance of other organizations, notably the procuratorates and the peoples' courts, should not be minimized.

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73. People's Daily, March 23, 1954, p. 1.

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committees below provincial level. Prior to the promulgation of the Constitution in September 1954, the establishment of these committees in administrative districts, cities, and counties was encouraged. The new Constitution only allows for the establishment of these committees in provinces and in municipalities directly under the central authority. 665

In the third place, with the consolidation of Communist political power at all levels, the position of minor parties is further endangered. For instance, the liquidation of capitalists in the transition stage will certainly reduce the political position of the China Association for the Promotion of Democracy. Eventually, minor parties will no longer exist as a political force in the ordinary sense because they will have no political influence.

1. Control and Infiltration of Minor Parties

The most effective way of eliminating minor parties and their activities is to exercise strict control over them, either through direct subjugation or infiltration. The guiding principles to be observed by all minor parties participating in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference indicates the degree to which these minor parties have subordinated themselves to the Communist Party of China. Minor parties "must assist the state organs and set the social forces in motion...to maintain close contact with the masses...to continue to consolidate and develop the alliance between China and the USSR... and to study Marxist-Leninist theories on a voluntary 665 668

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basis, study state policy, elevate political levels, practice criticism and self-criticism, and strive for ideological remolding." 665 668

Infiltration is the long-term method of eliminating the minor parties. As early as 1951, Chang Chih-i, head of the United Front department of the Central-South China Military and Political Committee, made this policy amply clear in an article calling for the assistance of the Communist Party of China in the expansion of minor parties.[78] He laid down four conditions under which the expansion of policy was to take place. (1) Organization of minor parties must be free from reactionary elements. (2) Expansion must be restricted to key cities and provincial capitals; small cities and counties would not be suitable for establishment of minor parties. (3) A party may not expand to more than twice its former strength. (4) Members of the Communist Party of China taken in by a minor party are not to exceed one-fifth of the total strength of the minor party; their purpose is to render direct assistance to the minor parties on organizational matters.

The fourth condition, if implemented, might result in the gradual extinction of minor parties. Furthermore, branches offices of minor parties can be abolished any time their services are no longer needed. The Chiang-men-Hsin-hui branch of

78. Yangtze Daily, May 10, 1951, p. 1.

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the Democratic League in Kwangtung was totally dissolved because reactionary elements[79] were reported to have been admitted. 665 668.

2. Minor Parties and "Pressure Politics"

In a democracy, the political activity of minor or opposition parties may indicate the measure of practicing democracy. Likewise, special interest groups, as such, can enjoy their political privileges under democratic rule. In Communist China, since public opinion is tightly controlled by the Communist Party, and since the minor parties have only assigned duties to perform, special interest groups and the dissident parties exert no "pressure" upon the state organizations dominated by the Party, nor do they take part in the making of decisions. 665

Deputies of the minor parties were allowed to make speeches at all sessions of the All-People's Conferences, but they limited themselves to praise, criticizing only those minor faults which the Communists themselves had admitted publicly.

Finally, with the retirement of aging leaders, whose authority dates from the pre-Communist period, and with the absence of young and vigorous new members, the value of the minor parties is in rapid decline.

79. Yangtze Daily, March 7, 1952, p. 3.

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CONCLUSION AND COMMENTS

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The Communist Party of China concerns itself with the maintenance of a militant and efficient Party organization and the stimulation of popular enthusiasm and support. Its organizations in the Central-South China region had proven their combative worth in the past -- prior to the assumption of power -- and in the first five years of the new regime. The present task, calling for the execution of policies aimed at the total reconstruction of society and the effective control of all segments of society, is one in which the Party has yet to display its competency. In the rural areas, the lower educational level of the Party members and the maladministration of the rural policies provide the greatest obstacles, and Party members working in the cities are equally susceptible to inefficiency, corruption, and mismanagement. Above all, traditional forces have exercised a retarding effect upon Communist policies. For instance, the peasant resistance is so strong that the regime is forced to tone down its rural policies. In the same vein, resistance to regimentation in the cities is responsible for the threat of renewed suppression of counterrevolutionary activities. Finally, the severe demands imposed upon Party members and the frequent and violent reorganization of the Party intimidate the members and plant seeds of discontent and distrust among the rank and file. These factors could accelerate the disintegration of the Party machine and the collapse of the regime. The control of all state and mass organizations will be possible only if the Communists score a victory over the traditional forces of Chinese society.

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court of this region. At lower levels, the old courts were left intact and were allowed to function. However, centralized control over these local courts was subsequently established. 692

The courts, like other organs of the state, underwent several stages in development; however, they followed a different course and their functions varied from time to time. For instance, during the first stage, prior to June 1952, the courts served as instruments of violence, carrying out with relentlessness the land reform in the rural areas and the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns in the cities. During the second stage, between June 1952 and the spring of 1953, the courts completed judicial reform that enabled them to legalize their authority, replacing that of the former courts. During the third stage, from September 1954 to the present, they have consolidated their authority and have begun to function as judicial organs in conformity with the Organic Law of the People's courts of the People's Republic of China. Let us now discuss the three stages in greater detail. 692 668

1. The First Stage The distinguishing feature of judicial activities during this stage is the wide use of the People's tribunal in the land reform, and in Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns. This devotion to the administration of the criminal code in connection with the suppression of opposition made possible the concentration of judicial authority in the hands of Party functionaries and the complete subordination of judicial functions for political expediency.

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According to the regulation and the directive concerning the People's tribunal for land reform[3] issued in 1951 by the Central-South China Military and Political Committee, the county and city tribunals were to be directly under the leadership of the People's governments concerned and to be a component part of the People's court of the respective level. People's tribunals were established in every two or three ch'ü and were given sole authority in dealing with criminal matters, including the authority to impose sentences of not more than five years' imprisonment. They also have the authority to prosecute counterrevolutionaries and to initiate arrests. The political character of the tribunal can be detected by the composition of the adjudication committee, composed of a president, a deputy, and several judges, half of which was to be appointed by the People's government and the rest "elected" by the People's representatives from public security, the Peasant's Association, and other mass organizations. Specifically, the county head in some cases and the ch'ü head in all cases were the presidents of the tribunals.

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Tribunals were rapidly organized during the land reform. By June 1951, there were 366 county tribunals and 1,841 ch'ü tribunals established in the Central-South Region, and 143,761 cases had been tried.[4] However, these figures fail to suggest

3. Text of both in Yangtze Daily, Feb. 1, 1951, p. 2, and ibid., July 29, 1951, p. 1.

4. Official record of Conference summarizing the work of People's tribunals in the Central-South Region, Yangtze Daily, June 12, 1951, p. 1, and ibid., July 13, 1951, p. 3.

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the violence and the intensity involved. The operation of these tribunals relied heavily on mass hysteria and mob hatred. The administration of the trials by Party functionaries insured the use of terror. When cases were heard, the judges of the People's tribunals bombarded the masses with propaganda. The masses were sufficiently agitated to denounce as reactionaries those whom the Party had previously singled out for prosecution. After mass emotion was aroused and denunciations were made, judgment was passed by the masses and sentence rendered at the instigation of the adjudication committee controlled by the Party. Such a mass trial could not avoid intimidation and violence toward the accused.

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During the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, People's tribunals were established by the directives of the Government Administration Council.[5] They were organized in the administrative units and in the armed forces. The president of the adjudication committee consequently was the leading figure. Members of the committee were activists representing various Party-controlled organizations. These tribunals were empowered to mete out death sentences. Such a practice illustrates the extent to which a judicial organ can be manipulated by the Communists for political purposes.

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5. Directive on the organization of the tribunals in Yangtze Daily, April 1, 1952, p. 1, and ibid., March 26, 1952, p. 1, respectively.

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The effective use of People's tribunals as weapons of force was introduced after the judicial reform.[6] During the nationwide elections in 1953-54, People's tribunals were again widely used. Their main function was to suppress and punish violators and unqualified candidates and voters, including those citizens accused of counterrevolutionary activity. These tribunals worked in coordination with the election committees at all levels. As of February 1954, in thirty-six counties in Kiangsi Province, 75 tribunals were established in 312 hsiangs and towns.

2. The Second Stage Numerous problems faced the judicial organs after the Communist seizure of power. At least two serious changes were contemplated by the Communists -- the elimination of the code system and the replacement of the Nationalist-trained judicial workers. But they were not completed until the judicial reform in 1952. With the exception of the complete abandonment of the Kuomintang code, the Liu-fa Ch'üan-shu[7] [The Compendium of the Six Codes], the Communists did not attempt to change the Kuomintang court system or to replace its judicial personnel. This was by no means an indication that the old system would be

6. Reports concerning this type of tribunal in People's Daily, Feb. 7, 1954, p. 3.

7. One edition of this work is Wu Ching-hsiung, Chung-hua Min-kuo Liu-fa Hui-pien, 6 vols., [The Compendium of the Six Codes of the Republic of China], Shanghai, Hui-wen T'ang, 1947.

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July 1952 law concerning counterrevolutionaries was issued by the Ministry of Public Security of the Government Administration Council.[43] Decisions on the means of suppression of counterrevolutionaries can be made either by the People's court or by the public security agencies at county and municipal levels. In the villages, hsiang and ch'ü governments may initiate this control, subject to the approval of the public security agencies at the county level. Likewise, sub-stations in the city may also initiate control, subject to the approval of public security sub-bureaus. Persons under surveillance are deprived of their political rights, including the right to vote. The period of surveillance may be three years or less. During the period, the individual is sent to a forced-labor camp.

The regulations governing "Reform-through-labor," issued by the Government Administration Council in August 1954, provided a detailed scheme for the establishment of forced labor throughout China.[44] This centralized management no doubt facilitates control of counterrevolutionaries, but it imposes undue hardships and cruelties upon them.

COMMENTS AND CONCLUSION

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The reliance upon the use of terror and force for the maintenance of "public order and safety"

43. People's Daily, July 16, 1952, p. 1.
44. Ibid., Sept. 7, 1954, p. 2; English text in Current Background, No. 293, Sept. 15, 1954.

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logically increases the power of the People's courts and of the public security organizations. The wide use of People's tribunals and the arbitrary display of power by the public security agencies hastens the consolidation of political power by the Communists. In order to achieve an effective weapon of terror, the Communists have closely co-ordinated the use of these instruments with the several drives carried out in the past.

Throughout these drives, mass emotion was aroused and past hatred revived. The Communists have skillfully enlisted informers whose reports sow seeds of distrust among the people. The establishment of security committees in all organizations in the cities and rural districts increases the efficiency of the intelligence network and serves as a basis upon which Communist security policy rests. Nevertheless, these measures for suppression are far from complete. As already pointed out, intensive subordination to a single will creates firmer resistance; the more rapidly a change is imposed on a society, the stronger will be the opposition. It is not surprising to discover that, in spite of the many measures taken by the regime to suppress opposition in the Central-South Region, subversive activities continue.

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SUBVERSIVE POTENTIALITIES

INTRODUCTION

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The suppression of the opposition of landlords and counterrevolutionaries is the foremost task of the Communist regime in China in its endeavor to consolidate political gains. Hence, in examining the Communist consolidation of power in China, one cannot but notice the forces at work which are either actively or potentially undermining the Communist position. These forces, which can be generally divided into the following three categories, are all regarded as "subversive" by the Communists: (1) the most tangible forces openly hostile to Peking and labeled "counterrevolutionary"; (2) other activities which are not openly rebellious but equally harmful to the Peking regime, such as corruption, theft, and waste of government property; (3) intangible forces, such as tension and public discontent, which, if not checked in time, may also weaken the Peking regime. In the following discussion, these three categories of "subversive" forces will be separately investigated.

I. COUNTERREVOLUTIONARIES

The Communists in China employ the term "counterrevolutionaries" in at least two senses: by "counterrevolutionaries" they mean foreign agents, Kuomintang agents, and former members of the Nationalist Government who remain in Mainland China and are engaged in activities against the Peking regime; "counterrevolutionaries" may also be applied to armed bandits, landlords,

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and members of secret societies, in addition to those agents included in the first definition. This means that obviously anyone whose actions seem contrary to Communist principles can be labeled a "counterrevolutionary." In the following discussion, these groups of "counterrevolutionaries" will be treated separately, although it must be noted that clear lines of demarcation do not exist among these groups, and that the Communists in using these terms do not undertake to define them in a clear-cut manner.

A. "Bandits"

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The Chinese often use the term "bandit" to designate all underground and openly rebellious armed forces. (A current example of this usage is found in the Formosa press, which refers to all the Communists on the China Mainland as bandits.) The particularly intensive Communist campaigns against such armed "bandits" in Central-South China can be attributed to the fact that certain mountainous areas in the region have been used as refuges by rebels. The largest concentrations of bandits in this region have been reported in Kwangsi Province and in western Hunan and Kwangtung provinces. At one time Communist officials admitted the existence of 800,000 bandits in Central-South China.[1]

Communist military campaigns against "bandits" in this region may be grouped into three stages,[2] each characterized by different strategic

1. Ch'ang-chiang Jih-pao [Yangtze Daily], Hankow, August 30, 1950.

2. See reports by T'ao Chu and T'an Cheng in Yangtze Daily, Sept. 23, 1950; Sept. 20, 1950, p. 1. Also consult reports on Kwangtung, Kiangsi provinces in same newspaper, Sept. 25, 1950, pp. 2, 3.

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that organized opposition had been wiped out before the end of 1950. According to Teng Tzu-hui, vice-chairman of the Central-South China Military and Political Committee, these campaigns had eliminated a total of 1,150,000 bandits and 106,000 weapons had been seized from the enemy,[3] although later statistics on these campaigns in Central-South China are not available, unrest persisted and found expression in robberies and organized sabotage. An editorial in the People's Daily of Peking for November 11, 1954 warned of renewed "bandit activity."[4] It mentioned in particular the existence of a bandit group, 7,000 strong, in the area of O-hsien in Hupeh Province. This would indicate that, although armed bandits were less active, their potential threat to the regime had not been completely eradicated.

B. Landlords

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The aboliton of the absentee land-ownership system is one of the basic aims of Communism. In Communist China, the elimination of the landlords as a class in the rural community was made the primary goal in the Land Reform Movement. However, an investigation of Communist reports on landlords after the land reform in 1951 shows that here again the term "landlord" is very loosely defined. Many of those who were accused of belonging to the landlord class in Central-South China did not actually own any land. Among them were political dissenters, including expelled Communists.

Since it is impossible to ascertain the exact number of landowners in this region, it is difficult

3. Yangtze Daily, December 13, 1951, p. 1.
4. People's Daily, November 10, 1954. p. 1,

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to measure their potential threat to the Communist regime. One unsubstantiated estimate places the number of landlords in pre-Communist Central-South China at four per cent of the total rural population, or approximately 800,000. In executing the land reform program, the Communists used violence. Many landlords accused of severe "crimes" were put to death; most lost their holdings and were thus deprived of their livelihood; the smallest group of landowners was placed under surveillance. Unfortunately, there are no statistics on any of these groups.

As the land reform drew to a close in 1952 and economic reconstruction got underway, Communist reports revealed the rise of a new-rich class," which the Communists regarded as "potential landlords." Some of the remaining old landlords and new ones were said to be active in rural political organizations and producer's co-operatives. It was reported in 1954 that one out of every ten hsiang was dominated by these unreformed "landlords."[5]

The Communists have tried to blame all criminal and subversive activities on landlords. One report said that among the 44 criminals arrested in 1954 in Yang-ch'un (Kwangtung Province), 14 were landlords.[6] Another report stated that in Canton there were cases of arrests involving "landlords under surveillance" and other types of criminals.[7]

5. Wang Ch'ing "Tsai Chi-ts'eng Hsüan-chü Chung Kai-chin Lo-hou Hsiang Cheng-ch'üan Kung-tso" ["Improve Backward Hsiang Government during the Basic-level Election"], Hsin-hua Yüeh-pao [New China Monthly], No. 4, Apr. 28, 1954, pp. 18-19.

6. People's Daily, July 18, 1954, p. 1.

7. Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 972 Hong Kong, American-Consulate Gen'l, Jan. 20, 1955, p. 4-6.

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Such reports point to the possibility that even today the richer elements in rural communities may still constitute a disturbing influence as far as the Communists are concerned

C. Kuomintang Elements and Spies

After the "bandits" and "landlords" were brought under control, the Communists in Central-South China launched in 1951 the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries Movement. It was carried out in three stages: (1) first was the so-called "administrative suppression" stage that stressed the dissolution of "counterrevolutionary organizations"; (2) the second stage was devoted to the arrest of counterrevolutionaries after mass meetings. At these meetings, accusations were made and past injustices reviewed. Most of the arrests were made on the basis of these accusations. (3) The third stage called for the registration of the remaining counterrevolutionaries with public security agencies so that they could be kept under constant surveillance and arrested, if necessary. Although no reliable survey on the number of counterrevolutionaries arrested and executed is available, judging from the intensity and the scope of the movement, the number must have been large.[8] For example, during an unspecified ten-month period in 1950-51, the Communists reported in Kwangtung Province alone the execution of 28,332 people out of 89,701 arrested.[9]

8. For additional information, consult Hu-nan Fei-ch'ing [Hunan Under Communist Rule], and Chiang-hsi Fei-ch'ing [Kiangsi Under Communist Rule], published by Sixth Section, Central Committee, Nationalist Party in Taipei, in 1954, 1955 respectively.

9. Ku Ta-ts'un, lt. governor, Kwangtung Province, reported these figures in Nan-fang Jih-pao [South China Daily], Sept. 10, 1951, p. 1.

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of the State Council, 1,268 corruption cases involving 1,826 people were prosecuted during the first six months of 1954.[31] The 1955 Supervisory Conference devoted a great deal of attention to a study of this issue.[32] A flood of reports on corruption and waste appeared in the Communist press. One of the most serious cases involved the Mining and Geological School in Changsha, Hunan Province, which was accused of misuse of government rations. The school was reported to have wasted rice rations and falsified personnel statements in an effort to obtain more government rations.[33]

All of these reports indicate that, despite persistent efforts to eradicate corruption, abuses both in and outside the government continue to occur.

III. TENSION AND DISCONTENT

Extreme centralization and control of governmental, economic, and social activities logically lead to discontent and tension. If not checked in time, these undercurrents of public dissatisfaction may create a real threat to the government.

A. Public Discontent

1. Restrictions on Private Life

In Central-South China, as in all other regions of China, the individual citizen cannot choose how his day is spent; a fixed schedule has been imposed on him. After his working hours, the peasant, for

31. Ta-kung Pao, Tientsin, Mar. 24, 1955, p. 1.
32. For report on conference, see Kuang-ming Jih-pao [Enlightenment Daily], Peking, June 13, 1955, p. 1.
33. Ta-kung Pao, Tientsin, Mar. 16, 1955, p. 1.

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instance, is required to attend meetings, enroll in winter or night schools, and participate in other group activities prescribed by the government. He must accept Party counsel on how to lead his daily life and how to spend his money. These impositions are time-consuming and irritating to those who must endure them.

Labor discipline controls all working hours. Any violation of discipline may provoke servere penalties. Technical schools, cultural classes and other group activities have been arranged for every worker. Since most workers hold membership in a number of Communist-led organizations, such multiple obligations leave them little leisure time, and their days pass in weariness and discontent.

2. Tax Burden and Business Restrictions

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In the rural districts, the Communist San Ting Policy, formulated at the end of 1953, fixes quotas for farm production, purchasing, and marketing. This policy has aroused resentment. Measures which regulate the sale of farm surplus products -- mainly rice and cotton -- to the centralized market, also meet resistance. But the measure which has provoked the most discontentment among the farmers is "deduction for services rendered by the government to the farmers." During the conversion of the old currency, the Communists in Kwangsi Province admitted that nine deductions were imposed on income.[34] These deductions included shares for the credit co-operatives, shares for the supply and marketing co-operatives, repayment of loans, bond subscriptions, and other items.

34. People's Daily, Peking, March 3, 1955, p. 3.

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The businessmen do not fare any better. Sale, purchase, sources of supply, and market outlet are regulated and controlled. Government bonds must be purchased, and exorbitant taxation has been imposed. Trapped by restriction and taxation, many businessmen have been forced to abandon their enterprises. The general atmosphere is certainly not conducive to public confidence in the government.

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3. Compulsory Services

The Communist government frequently drafts rural workers for public labor. For major irrigation projects, even farmers in distant areas are mobilized. The Ching River flood control project in Hupeh Province, for example, enlisted almost 200,000 "voluntary workers" from Central-South China.[35] To maintain a militia for emergency services, the government requires the young peasant to receive training in his spare time. When he is formally inducted into the militia, he is assigned to patrol the key centers in the village, guard and help to ship government grain, assist in combatting bandits, and take part in group activities organized for militia members.

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A parallel scheme is instituted for urban residents, requiring them to render certain services in the areas of their residence. They must attend meetings and stand ready to be called for patrol duties.[36] During 1951-53, citizens of Wuhan were ordered

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35. Yangtze Daily, March 30, 1952, p. 1.

36. Ibid., March 4, 1953, p. 3.

to patrol the streets at night.

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to patrol the streets at night. 000

Other controls imposed by the security agencies and other government branches add to public discontent. Among these measures are the extensive rationing system and the frequent investigations conducted by public security agencies. 668 434

The Communists appear to be cognizant of such inconveniences which cause public dissatisfaction. In order to mitigate the situation, the Communists stress the importance of adopting a "mass line" policy. This means that the government orders its agencies to be mindful, insofar as possible, of public wishes when carrying out government policies. Communist cadres are instructed to report public feeling to the government. Propaganda agencies then attempt to "explain away" public complaints and to restore the public temper. 668 208

B. Tension within Organizations

Extreme control and centralization exercised by the Communist Party result in tension within all Party, state, and mass organizations.[37] By establishing various agencies of control, the Party has achieved centralization of power; however, these numerous control agencies often duplicate their functions. This leads to suspicion, tension, and a growing sense of wasted effort in the control agencies and in the organizations controlled by these agencies. 668

1. Tension within Government

Party control over the government is evident

37. For comparison with tension in Soviet Union, see Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, Cambridge, Mass, Harvard Univ. Press, 1953; Carryington Moore, Jr., Terror and Progress USSR, Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1954.

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because all key officials in the government are members of the Party, and, as such, subject to control by the Party. Complication stems from the fact that there are three groups of control agencies -- the supervisory offices in the administration, the People's Procuratorates, and the public security agencies -- in addition to the control committee of the Party. Consequently, each government department has four control authorities to please. Although each of these control agencies was intended to stress a different aspect of control, the aggregate pressure is felt by the department staff and the employees in government-operated factories, co-operative stores, and other institutions.

The pressure of multiple control manifests itself when the government institutes a new project. In making the assignment, each level of the government has a goal in mind. As the order reaches the bottom of the hierarchy, where the actual work will be performed, the assignment usually becomes far more complex than intended by the original order. Each level of the government exhorts its subordinating levels to fulfill the planned goal, and the bottom level suffers under the accumulation of pressure and tension.

2. Tension within the Party

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The non-partisan in Communist China is subject to government pressure as described, but a Party member has to bear the Party pressure in addition to government pressure. Within the Party, indoctrination of the members is an unending process. Indeed, the demands on a Party member are so great that outsiders hesitate to join the Party. There is some evidence to suggest a decline in Party member-

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ship because of dissatisfactions resulting from this strict control. 665

The Communist Party, of course, does not hesitate to expel its discontented members. The expelled Party members may form a center around which subversive elements may rally. The Communists are apparently aware of this possibility, and are undoubtedly taking steps to ensure against such a development. The exact Communist method of disposing of expelled Party members is not known. An examination of available reports on expulsion of Party members shows that, if accused of definite offenses, the individuals may be tried by the "People's court," as in the cases of Liu Ching, Sung Ying, and I Chi-kuang.[38] Or the undesirable Party members may simply disappear from the public scene, with no more than a brief announcement of the disciplinary action taken against them. Such was the fate of a county Party secretary in Hsü-ch'uan (Kiangsi Province).[39] There is reason to assume that, unless those banished from the Party were imprisoned or put to death, they will represent an influence constantly disturbing to the Party's stability and power.

3. Tension within Mass Organizations

Pressure imposed upon the mass organizations by the government and the Party causes the increase of tension within these organizations. To keep these groups under control, the Party expels the undesirable 668

38. Yangtze Daily, December 15, 1951, p. 1.
39. Ibid., January 9, 1952, p. 1.

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elements and cultivates trustworthy cadres. This action, designed to ensure the allegiance of the mass organizations to the Party, itself forms a link in the cycle of power-control-tension. An atmosphere of fear is engendered in order to keep the members of the organizations from deviations; and yet fear breeds tension and the thought of rebellion. Thus far, the Communists have been able to control the mass organizations by constant vigilance and a steady flow of propaganda. Such organizations as the New Democratic Youth Corps and the Federation of Democratic Women, for example, actively serve the Communist Party without showing any signs of deterioration.

IV. CONCLUSION

Wherever there is a dictatorship, subversive potentialities exist. No matter how tight a rein the Communists in Central-South China may hold on the populace, three forces will continue to work against the rule of terror. These forces are the victims of Communist power, traditional resistance groups, and discontented Communist Party members.

The victims of Communist power are landlords, former Kuomintang officials, and those included in the general category of "counterrevolutionaries." Although most of these elements are imprisoned in forced-labor camps or are placed under police surveillance, they show an ability to remain resistant whenever the opportunity presents itself. However, as long as the Communists are capable of mustering huge police forces to suppress all opposition, open rebellion will be difficult.

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Traditional resistance groups have demonstrated their endurance in the revival of secret societies. They are difficult to eliminate because secret societies attract the great mass of illiterate peasants and laborers. Furthermore, their dissolution by government order before they lose popular support will only serve to add to public discontent.

As to the disillusioned Party members, nothing would please them more than the collapse of a system which has brought about their political ruin. If the Communists continue Party purges, as they have done during the past five years, the strength of this politically subversive group will continue to grow.

The degree of public discontent and tension among the populace and with organizations in Central-South China is by no means an indication of an impending collapse of the Communist power. It is, rather, a natural phenomenon in a regimented society. It is a threat to the Communists only in the sense that, if allowed to develop, it may lead to a total demoralization of the people and the eventual destruction of Party solidarity.

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caused bad feelings among workers toward the Party in Hupeh.[11] This state of affairs had been common in other parts of the country but was avoided in later stages of the labor movement.

III. DEMOCRATIC REFORM AND POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION AMONG THE WORKING CLASS

In the course of organizing the Chinese working class in 1949 and 1950, the Communists discovered that "reactionary elements" were still active in factories and mines and on wharves and docks. Some of these "reactionary elements" were organizers of secret societies such as the I-kuan-tao [the Unity Society], the Chiu-kung-tao [the Nine Palace Society], the Hung-pang [the Red Society], and the Ch'ing-pang [the Green Society]; others were alleged to be Nationalist agents or remnants of the Nationalist army. To the Communists, it seemed necessary to start a political movement among the masses to clean such remnants of feudal rule from industry in order to prepare the country for socialization.

A conference called in Hankow by the Central-South Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in May 1951 initiated the "Democratic Reform" Drive among the working class in this region. The movement as defined by Yeh Chien-ying, Chairman of Kwangtung Province, covered workers in four main industries: (1) public factories and enterprises; (2) shipping stevedores or dock coolies; (3) inland river transportation; and (4) private factories and enterprises. Schools and government departments did not come within its

11. Workers' Daily, Dec. 11, 1949, p. 4.

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scope and were not to be affected by the movement.[12]

By the end of July 1951, more than forty enterprises in the Wuhan area had developed a "Democratic Reform" Drive. The separate stages involved in developing such a movement within an enterprise were: (1) the launching of propaganda for "New Democracy" among the workers; (2) the organization of small units of workers for a struggle against "reactionary elements"; (3) the identification of the most obvious examples of such "reactionary elements"; and (4) the encouragement of workers to make accusations against those suspected of counterrevolutionary activities.

The Communists said that through these procedures many members of secret societies, escaped "landlords," local "despots," bandits, and Kuomintang officials were discovered hiding among the working class in this region.[13]

After the movement began in Canton, the local People's Government made 214 arrests within four months among the workers. Those arrested were sentenced to death, imprisonment, or public surveillance in accordance with the degree of their guilt.[14]

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12. Current Background, Hong Kong, U. S. Consulate General, Oct. 15, 1951, No. 128.

13. Ch'ang-chiang Jih-pao [Yangtze Daily], Oct. 3, 1951, p. 1.

14. Nan-fang Jih-pao [South China Daily], August 20, 1951, p. 1.

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The "Democratic Reform" Drive was aimed at the purge of trade unions and the political indoctrination of the working class. The Communist press claimed that, after their successful struggle against these "reactionary elements," the political consciousness of the workers was higher and the trade-union organizations were stronger than they had been.

The "Five-Anti" Campaign and the "Resist-American-Aid-Korea" Movement were two other drives launched among the working class by the Communists to give workers political indoctrination.

IV. LABOR EMULATION AND PRODUCTION

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"Labor emulation" is the Communist means of increasing labor productivity without increasing cost of production. In organizing "labor emulation," the following steps are involved: (1) workers are organized to discuss the state's production plans; (2) the trade unions, on behalf of the workers, sign collective contracts with their respective administrations; (3) production meetings are held to discuss production problems; (4) workers plan and submit "rationalization" proposals to increase efficiency and popularize "advanced" methods of work.[15]

Labor emulation began in China proper in 1950. By 1953, about 80 per cent of the workers of the country had participated in this drive, and, according to Communist reports, production has been increased.

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15. People's China, Peking, May 16, 1954, pp 6-8.

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in Kwangtung to Shang-hang in Fukien and the one from Ch'ing-yüan to Fo-kang in Kwangtung. The location of mass labor contingents in the future will doubtless depend upon the selection of the routes to be built.

IV. A TYPICAL "REFORM-THROUGH-LABOR" CAMP IN CANTON

Railway and highway building, as well as construction of large water conservation projects, are all examples of the concentrated employment of mass labor. A somewhat different case is found in the employment in Kwangtung of forced-labor groups in various agricultural, mining, and industrial undertakings. A typical case is provided by the "reform-through-labor" units under the direction of the Canton Public Security Bureau.[14]

According to the Canton Public Security Bureau, at one time, municipal construction received the largest allocation of labor force under the control of the Bureau. However, the prisoners were also put to work in producing bricks and tiles, reclaiming waste land, planting fruit trees and food and commercial crops, raising farm animals, and manufacturing various handicraft products, including rope and wooden and bamboo wares.

The bureau stressed that forced labor was supplemented by political education. Many prisoners were

13. Chung-yang Ts'ai-ching Cheng-ts'e Fa-ling Hui-pien [Compilation of Laws and Regulations Concerning Financial and Economic Policies], Vol. III, Peking, Ts'ai-ching wei'yüan-hui, 1952, pp. 713-15.

14. Ta-kung Pao, Hong Kong, December 15, 1951.

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said to have been lazy when they first joined the "reform-through-labor" camps. Some attempted to use illness as an excuse to stay away from work while others tried to escape or even committ suicide. According to the Bureau, these conditions were surmounted by pointing out to the prisoners that "reform-through-labor" was the only way to start a new life, and political indoctrination was conducted by organizing the prisoners in groups studying systematically the history of social development, the people's democratic dictatorship, the new philosophy of life and the achievements of the People's Government during recent years.

According to the same report, prisoners were classified into separate groups according to the terms of sentence, age, phsyical condition, and former occupation. A brief period of work training was usually provided. Definite norms or quotas, which had to be observed by the prisoners in their work, were fixed in both qualitative and quantitative terms. Labor competitions were organized, and criticisms and commendations of individual workers were published in wall newspapers.

The report contended that as a result of "reform-through-labor" some prisoners worked very hard and changed their ideological outlook and were either given special rewards or had their sentences reduced, while others who refused to reform were punished. Especially interesting is the statement that after five months of forced labor and political education, most of the "counter-revolutionaries" had changed their ideological points of view and had acquired the habit of working. The Bureau also re-

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ported that prisoners released from the camps were sent back to their villages to start a new life, while those without homes were sent to production reformatories.

The report on Canton is probably representative of many a "reform-through-labor" camp. Life in such camps is described as serene, productive, and not at all harsh. "As to the prisoner's daily life, every farm has its own reading room. Officers in charge have taught them to sing. Every Saturday night there is either a discussion meeting or a recreation program. Proper attention is paid to diet and hygienic condition..." [15] Official Communists comments have also occasionally pointed to individual instances in which persons were said to have regained their physical health and spiritual well-being as a result of ideological reform and physical labor.[16]

The official account mentioned above does not agree with some other reports on treatment within such camps. One such report, for instances, states that prisoners in Canton labor camps received in 1952 only 12 shih-liang (about 13.2 ounces) of rice per day,[17] supplemented with only such vegetables as the prisoners grew themselves. The daily food

15. Nan-fang Jih-pao [Southern Daily], Sept. 8, 1951.

16. Ibid.

17. Thirteen and two-tenths ounces of rice are equivalent to 1,270 calories, which is below the level of normal subsistence.

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state farms in Lo-ting, Weng-yüan, Lo-ch'ang, Jen-hua, and Nan-hsiang in Kwangtung. The total prisoner population in Kwangtung was said to number 400,000 in 1953,[23] and similar reports are available concerning Kwangsi and Kiangsi.

VI. STATE FARM IN HONAN

According to a Taiwan report, there were about 100,000 "counterrevolutinaries" undergoing "reform-through-labor" in Honan Province during 1953.[24] In addition to water conservation work on the upper course of the Hwai River, some of the prisoners work on state farms. One example may be found in the report of three American POW's who refused repatriation after the Korean War, but returned to this country in 1955.[25]

The 1,500-acre state farm where they worked is located in Honan. It had 35 tractors and 965 laborers sent there for political reorientation from other parts of the country. All laborers worked 9 hours a day and six days a week. Food was said to be of the average Chinese standard. The monthly wage of an ordinary laborer was between ¥ 150,000 and ¥ 200,000 (old currency), the equivalent of US$6-8. All expenses except housing had to be met by the individuals. Political education, lasting several hours a day, followed a

23. Fei-tang Hsun-lien Ti P'ou-hsi [An Analytical Study of Indoctrination of the Communist Party], Taipei, Chung-yang wei-yuan-hui ti-ssu-tsu, March 1953, p. 14. 24. Ibid.

25. "Turncoat GI's Tell Story of Red China," U.S. News and World Report, July 22, 1955, pp. 21-26, 113-15.

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definite program which in this case was: Monday review of world affairs; Tuesday, discussion of the world situation; Wednesday, criticism of individuals; Thursday, China's internal situation; Friday, criticism of individuals again; Saturday, the discussion of the criticisms for the whole week. The "criticism of individuals" is what the people on the farm feared most, because when a person came up for criticism, his fate was virtually sealed. Fear of the leader and fear of each other constitute an essential part of political re-education.

VII. COMMENTS

Although official Communist Chinese sources have been notably reticent on the development of "reform-through-labor" establishments in individual areas which are sometimes camouflaged by being called factories,[26] such information as is available in connection with the Central-South provinces points to certain considerations to which attention may be directed. It is entirely possible that these characteristics are by no means restricted to conditions in the Central-South.

1. "Reform-through-labor" establishments such as the ones in Central-South China serve the dual purpose of providing political punishment and large reserve pools of cheap labor, endowed in the majority of cases with high mobility. The presence

26. Freedom Front, Hong Kong, April 25, 1955, p. 22.